Seizure of Northern Guam

TIYAN AND BARRIGADA 1

From their hard-won positions on the Fonte heights and from the slopes of the mountain ridges that marked the trace of the FBHL, the assault troops of III Corps could easily see the broad expanse of jungle, which covered the northern plateau. Just forward of the 3d Marine Division positions, the ground fell away sharply to a brush-covered lowland studded with small hills where the Agana River flowed into a large swamp southeast of the capital. The terrain in front of the 77th Infantry Division left flank was badly cut up by ravines formed by stream tributaries of the Pago River. Most of the rest of General Bruce's zone of advance was also high ground, trackless and dotted with barriers of thick vegetation, which gradually grew denser on the approaches to Pago Bay. (See Map 29.)

The IIIAC scheme of maneuver for the 31 July attack called for the 77th Division to move northeast from its FBHL positions, pivoting on left flank units to come abreast of the 3d Division on a cross-island objective line, which ran just north of Agana, turned south through the Ordot area, and then headed east to the coast at Pago Point. General Bruce's plan directed an advance in regimental columns to effect the quickest possible passage of the 10 miles of hill country that separated Mt. Tenjo from the objective. Thorough reconnaissance had indicated that no significant enemy opposition would be encountered—and none was.

On schedule at 0630 on the 31st, the 77th Division moved out from the FBHL with the 307th Infantry in the lead. At first the soldiers were able to follow a fresh-cut road that led along the axis of advance, but the head of the column soon passed the sweating engineers and their bulldozers, which were engaged in a running battle with the rain-sodden ground. Striking out cross-country, the long, snaking line trudged over the rugged terrain in a march that seemed at times to involve more up and down movement than it did forward progress. One marcher later described his experiences graphically:

The distance across the island is not far, as the crow flies, but unluckily we can't fly. The nearest I came to flying was while descending the slippery side of a mountain in a sitting position.... After advancing a few yards you find that the handle of the machine gun on your shoul-

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *IIIAC SAR; 3d MarDiv SAR; 3d MarDiv Jnl;* 3d MarDiv D-2 and D-3 Periodic Rpts, 31Jul-3Aug44; 77th InfDiv OpRpt; 77th InfDiv Jnl; 1st ProvMarBrig SAR; GSDF Study; MajGen Andrew D. Bruce, USA, "Administration, Supply, and Evacuation of the 77th Infantry Division on Guam," Military Review, vol. 24, no. 10 (Dec44).



COLUMN OF SOLDIERS of the 305th Infantry advances cross-island on 31 July at the start of the attack on northern Guam. (USA SC272338)



JUNGLE TRAIL is scouted by Marine tanks with covering infantry during the advance in northern Guam. (USMC 91166)

der, your pack and shovel, canteens, knife, and machete all stick out at right angles and are as tenacious in their grip on the surrounding underbrush as a dozen grappling hooks. Straining, sweating, and swearing avails you nothing so vou decide on a full-bodied lunge-success crowns your efforts as all the entangling encumbrances decided to give up the struggle simultaneously. Just before you hit the ground a low swinging vine breaks your fall by looping itself under your chin, almost decapitating you and snapping your helmet fifteen vards to the rear. . . . You untangle your equipment, retrieve your helmet, and move on. The flies and mosquitos have discovered your route of march and have called up the reinforcements including the underfed and undernourished who regard us as walking blood banks. We continue to push on. . . . *

Despite the difficult terrain, the 307th kept up a good pace and reached the Pago River early in the afternoon. Patrols discovered an unguarded concentration camp on the banks of the river and released a group of about 2,000 happy Guamanians. As the natives started moving back toward Agat along the column of soldiers, the Americans shared their rations, cigarettes, and whatever else they could spare with the hungry men, women, and children.

The lead unit of Colonel Tanzola's regimental column, the 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, moving to the right rear of the 307th, met the only opposition that was offered to the advance of the 77th Division. As scouts of 3/5 approached the village of Yona late in the afternoon of the 31st, a number of Japanese hidden amidst the buildings

opened fire. Deploying quickly, the leading company attacked and overran the village, killing 5 enemy and scattering the remainder of a force estimated at 50 men. Moving on, the 3d Battalion reached Pago Point before nightfall and set up on a hill there in all-around defense. Companies of the other battalions of the 305th established blocking positions along the division southern boundary from that point to the FBHL, where the 4th Marines had relieved the regiment earlier in the day. With the advance of the 77th Division to the east coast, the 1st Brigade, temporarily reinforced by the 306th Infantry, assumed responsibility for pacifying the southern half of Guam.

Like the 77th Division, the 3d Marine Division encountered little opposition on 31 July. General Turnage attacked with three regiments abreast at 0630, and by nightfall, when the advancing units held up, they had seized 4,000–5,000 yards of important terrain, including 4,000 yards of the crucial Agana-Pago Bay Road. The capital of the island was once again in American hands, and in the town plaza, amidst the shattered remnants of houses and government buildings, an advance division supply dump was operating at a brisk pace.

The honor of liberating Agana fell to 3/3, which advanced up the coastal road. At 1030, scouts of its assault platoons entered the town cautiously, threading their way through the rubble and the mines, which were strewn everywhere. Within 15 minutes, the battalion had reached the central plaza, and by noon was through the ruins and had set up in the northern outskirts on the regi-

²Quoted in HistDiv, WD, Guam, Operations of the 77th Division (21 July-10 August 1944) (Washington, 1946), p. 65, hereafter HistDiv, WD, 77th Div on Guam.

mental objective. The rest of the 3d Marines was soon up on line with the 3d Battalion. At the start of the day's advance, 1/3 had held positions along the northern lip of the Fonte River valley, where its lines were soon masked by the forward movement of 2/21. Temporarily in reserve, 1/3 then followed up the assault units of 2/3, which reached and secured its portion of the Agana-Pago Bay Road by noon.

The road was also the initial objective of the 21st Marines, but the lead elements of 2/21 and 3/21, with a longer distance and more rugged terrain to travel, did not reach their goal until 1350. Moving along the right boundary, 3/21 tangled with a small force of Japanese holding a pillbox near Ordot and wiped out the defenders, one of the few such clashes during the day's advance. In the same vicinity, the 3/21 command post group, moving to a new forward position, scattered a force of 15-20 Japanese it encountered behind the lines. The enemy were evidently unaware that the Marine advance had passed them by, a tribute to the nature of the terrain.

On the right of the division zone of action, the 9th Marines had the farthest distance to go on 31 July over ground as bad as that any unit encountered. Like 3/21 on its left flank, 1/9 met and overcame resistance from a small outpost of enemy troops left behind to impede movement through the Ordot supply area. Then, at 1415, two enemy light tanks appeared out of the brush, spraying the advancing Marines with machine gun fire, killing one man and wounding three others. An alert bazooka team took care of both tanks, and the advance resumed. At 1510. the 9th Marines had reached its objective, which was partially along the cross-island road. A platoon of the division tank battalion was able to join the regiment and add strength to the antitank defenses.

Earlier in the afternoon, General Geiger had authorized the 3d Division to continue moving forward as long as firm contact was maintained across the front. Although General Turnage alerted all units for a possible further advance, only the 3d Marines actually moved out. The 21st Marines committing 1/21 on the left, was engaged in shifting its frontline units to the right, in order to maintain contact with the 9th Marines, while the 9th was consolidating its link with the 307th Infantry along the division boundary.

Major Bastian's 3/3 had little difficulty in advancing from Agana once it jumped off at 1545. Before dusk, it had seized 1,200-1,500 yards of the roads northeast of the capital, one of which led to Finegayan and the other to Barrigada through the road junction village of San Antonio. On the right, 1/3 passed through the lines of the 2d Battalion and almost immediately entered an extensive swamp, which was the source of the Agana River. The going was slow and rough, and it was dark before the lead elements could dig in on dry land. The assault battalions set up perimeter defenses for the night about a mile and a half apart, with 2/3in reserve positions blocking the gap.

As 3/3 was digging in, two small jeep-mounted patrols of Reconnaissance Company cleared the forward positions of the battalion and moved along the road to San Antonio. Their mission was to check the trail network leading to Tumon Bay and Tiyan airfield. Both patrols sighted small groups of Japanese, hiding out in houses along the routes followed, and exchanged fire with them before turning back to the outskirts of Agana. As a combined patrol, the group then drove along the shore road until it was stopped by a tangle of trees blown across the path. In the gathering darkness, the reconnaissance force turned back again with little more to report to General Turnage than that some Japanese were located forward of the Marine lines. At the division CP. plans were laid for new motorized patrols the following day, this time bolstered by half-tracks and tanks.³

After a quiet night with no enemy activity, the 3d Division attacked at 0700 on the 1st with a scheme of maneuver calculated to pinch the 21st Marines out of the front line of a narrowing division zone. General Turnage ordered the 3d Marines to hold its positions once the 1st Battalion moved out of the swamp area and came abreast of 3/3. In advancing, 1/3 extended toward its right, closing in front of 1/21. The 21st Marines moved out with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, but 2/21soon halted and withdrew to reserve positions when it was covered by 3/21. At 0910, the 3d Battalion was ordered to pivot on its right and occupy the boundary between the 3d and 9th Marines until its position was masked by the advance of the 9th. By 1400, Colonel Craig's regiment had completed this maneuver, after moving with difficulty through heavy brush and irregular terrain to seize the remaining portion of the Agana-Pago Bay Road in its zone. The 21st Marines, less 3/21, which was attached to the 3d Marines, was ordered into division reserve during the day, replacing 2/9, which reverted to regimental control.

With the readjustment of lines completed, the division resumed its general advance at 1500. Forward progress was steady and enemy resistance negligible. By 1745, when General Turnage called a halt, the center of the division was just short of the airfield dispersal area and the right was within easy striking distance of San Antonio.

The greatest problem facing the 3d Division on 1 August was the hundreds of mines that the Japanese had planted on all roads leading north. The bombdisposal teams of the 19th Marines were hard put to find, let alone remove or destroy, all the lethal explosives the enemy had buried. Inevitably, several vehicles were blown apart and their passengers killed or wounded during the day. When an armored reconnaissance patrol was attempted at 1745, its nine tanks and a half-track were turned back by a profusion of mines on the coastal road to Finegayan. The armored vehicles were able to drive along the entire western side of Tiyan airfield, where it ran along a low cliff, but they could find no usable roads that led down toward the coast. Near the far end of the airstrip, an undetermined number of Japanese opened fire on the tanks from concealed positions in the brush, but the patrol avoided a fire fight in order to return to friendly positions before dark. Like the motorized reconnaissance on the previous

^{*}The original patrol makeup on 31 July had included two half-tracks, but both broke down en route to the objective.

afternoon, this patrol on 1 August developed little vital information on Japanese dispositions or strength in the 3d Division zone.

Undoubtedly, the most significant accomplishment of the day was the seizure of the Agana-Pago Bay Road along its entire length. This feat provided the solution to formidable logistical problems, which would otherwise have plagued the 77th Division. The Army assault regiments, the 307th and 305th Infantry, had jumped off at 0700 on the 1st and had crossed the Pago River soon after. Inexplicably, the Japanese had failed to destroy the main bridge over the river, and 3/305 seized it without incident at 0800. Within two hours, both regiments had secured the cross-island road in their zones, a stretch including RJ 171, where an intersecting road curved north through the jungle to San Antonio. The soldiers, keeping their direction by compass bearings, pushed on through the dense vegetation, taking advantage of trails wherever they occurred and blazing new paths where there were none. All assault units were short of rations and water, but were well supplied with small arms ammunition; the Japanese had provided scant opportunity to do much firing. By nightfall, the 305th Infantry was located in perimeter defenses one and a half miles northeast of RJ 171, and the 307th was generally on line with it and in contact with the 9th Marines near San Antonio. The 306th Infantry, less 2/306 in corps reserve, was set up near RJ 171, having marched there during the day after being relieved on the FBHL by the 22d Marines.

The 77th Division began to use the

Agana-Pago Bay Road as its main supply route (MSR) almost as soon as it was captured. In planning the IIIAC drive to seize northern Guam, General Geiger had counted on the 77th Division to cut a new road from the Agat beachhead to the east coast road near Yona. Terrain difficulties, compounded by frequent rains, and the time factors involved forced abandonment of the road-building project late on the 31st. The only practical alternative to construction of a new MSR was for both divisions to use the same road, a solution that General Bruce has noted was unorthodox enough for "the books [to] say it can't be done, but on Guam it was done—it had to be." ⁴ At 1620 on the 1st, General Geiger issued an order assigning the 77th Division priority over all traffic on the west coast road between Agat and a turnaround north of Adelup Point and equal priority with the 3d Division on the road beyond Adelup as far as the division boundary.

Moving throughout the afternoon and on through the night (with headlights as far as Agana and blackout lights beyond), a steady procession of 77th Division trucks, jeeps, and trailers moved supplies and equipment across the 3d Division zone. Three battalions of artillery and the light tank company of the 706th Tank Battalion also travelled the route on the 1st. General Bruce ordered the medium tank companies that were attached to his RCTs. the division artillery headquarters, and the remaining 155mm howitzer battalion to make the move as early as possible on the morning of the 2d. The

^{*} Bruce, op. cit., p. 8.

general wanted as much support available as he could get, for intelligence sources all indicated that the Japanese were present in force in the Barrigada area, the next 77th Division objective.

In order to pinpoint the suspected enemy positions, the division commander ordered an armored reconnaissance made. Fourteen light tanks moved out along the road to San Antonio at 0630 on 2 August, a half-hour prior to the general division attack. About 800 yards beyond San Antonio on the road to Barrigada, the tanks were fired on by enemy troops concealed in the thick bordering jungle. After replying to this opposition with machine gun and cannon fire, the tanks returned to the American lines at 0730. They were soon sent out again, but this time got as far as Barrigada without meeting any resistance.

At the road fork in the village, the tanks at first turned left to move toward Mt. Barrigada on the road to Finegayan. Opposite the mountain the tanks encountered a trio of trucks. backed by enemy riflemen, blocking the way. The tank gunners made short work of both trucks and defenders, killing an estimated 35 Japanese. Returning to Barrigada, the armored column moved northeast along a road that appeared to swing around the other side of the mountain. Within 1,000 yards of the village, the track had dwindled to the size of a foot trail, and the lead tank got hung up on a stump. At this moment, Japanese troops began firing from all sides with rifles, machine guns, and 20mm guns. Some enemy soldiers tried to rush the tanks. but they were swept away by heavy fire from bow and turret guns. Once the

stranded tank was able to work itself loose, the armored patrol withdrew without having suffered any losses.

As the day wore on, this morning tank action proved to be the sparring session before the main event. The 307th Infantry, after pausing along the road to San Antonio to distribute badly needed water and rations, moved out again at 1030 and ran head on into a bristling enemy defensive position covering approaches to the mountain and the village. The day's plan of attack called for 1/307 on the left to move through the jungle, cross the road to Finegayan north of Barrigada, and seize the western slopes of the mountain: 3/307 was to move through the village and attack the southern slopes. Both units met increasingly steady resistance from Japanese manning prepared positions in the jungle and amidst the scattered village houses. Companies that had been assigned wide attack zones were crowded together as withering defensive fire channelized the assault. The regimental reserve. 2/307, was committed to the fight, and both light and medium tanks were called up to support the advance. Tank fire-support, particularly the destruction wrought by the 75s of the Shermans, helped smash an opening in the defensive barrier; tank armor shielded wounded infantrymen being evacuated under Japanese fire. When the 307th dug in for the night, it held positions in Barrigada just beyond the road junction.

On the right of the division zone, the 305th Infantry ran up against the eastern extension of the enemy position at Barrigada. Hidden in the jungle, well camouflaged and dug in, the Japanese held their fire until the assault platoons of 3/305 and 1/305 were almost upon them and then shot with deadly accuracy. This tactic frustrated all attempts to outflank the enemy covering the open ground near Barrigada, and the battle resolved itself into a grinding tank-infantry action where gains of a few yards often took hours to win. Like the 307th, the 305th was finally able to fight its way past the Barrigada road junction and into the midst of the Japanese defenses when the approach of darkness forced a halt. The 77th Division, its combat experience thus far limited to minor patrol and defensive clashes, had had a rough introduction to the offensive in jungle warfare. In fighting often confused and frustrating. 29 men had been killed and 98 wounded, but the soldiers had proved their mettle.⁵

One unfortunate result of the day's action was that a gap developed between the 3d and 77th Divisions. In the wild tangle of trees and undergrowth along the boundary, the Marines and soldiers lost sight of each other after the morning attack began. The company of the 307th charged with maintaining contact spent most of its time out of touch with its own regiment as well as with the 9th Marines. General Turnage attached 2/21 to the 9th for the night to guard the open flank, and Lieutenant Colonel Smoak disposed his men along an unimproved trail that stretched from San Antonio to the positions that 3/9 had reached opposite Mt. Barrigada.

The 3d Marine Division did not encounter any significant opposition on 2 August for the third day in a row. As a result, the 9th Marines overran its objective, Tiyan airfield, by 0910. On order from division, Colonel Craig held his troops up at the north end of the field until the 3d Marines could come up on line.

During this lull, a Japanese tank caused quite a bit of excitement when it broke through the extended 9th Marines lines and raced through the airfield dispersal area toward the rear of the 3d Marines. As the tank roared by the CP of 1/3, one of the crew, scorning the main armament "opened the turret and began to shoot wildly with a pistol" ⁶ at the Marines, who were scurrying to take cover. When the tank careened into a ditch several hundred yards farther on, the crew abandoned it and escaped into the brush. Marine mediums came up later in the afternoon and destroyed the enemy vehicle.

About the time the Shermans were blasting the hulk of the enemy tank, the 3d Marines was striving to take as much ground as it could before dark. Colonel Stuart's regiment had been slowed all day by dense vegetation and mines along the few roads and trails in its zone. It was 1400 before the 3d came abreast of the 9th. At that time all division assault units continued the attack with the Japanese offering only sporadic and ineffectual resistance. As the 3d Marines wrestled its way through the jungle along the road to Finegayan, 3/21 covered the left flank of the regiment, reconnoitering the

⁵ This fight, covered in full and interesting detail in HistDiv, WD, 77th Div on Guam, pp. 75-102, furnishes an excellent study of small unit action.

^o Maj Henry Aplington II ltr to CMC, dtd 9Apr47.

bulging cape formed by Saupon and Ypao Points. Where the division zone narrowed at Tumon Bay, 3/21 was pinched out of line and reverted to control of the 21st Marines as part of the reserve. So difficult was the problem of contact in the jungle that the 3d Marines continued advancing after dusk until it could reach a favorable open area to hold up for the night. There, Colonel Stuart and his executive officer, Colonel James Snedeker, personally helped tie in the positions of assault units by the light of a full moon.

An armored reconnaissance patrol cleared the front lines of the 3d Marines at 1815, its mission the same as that of the similar group sent out the previous evening---find the Japanese. After moving about 1,200 yards toward Finegayan, the patrol spotted several groups of the enemy, but did not engage them, turning back instead on order at 1845. This sighting confirmed previous intelligence that the Japanese were located in the vicinity of Finegayan, but there was still no strong evidence of their numbers or dispositions.

No one at III Corps or 3d Division headquarters doubted that the lull in the battle was temporary. The Japanese already were defending bitterly one road that led to Finegavan in the 77th Division zone, and the 3d Division was advancing astride the other main artery, which led to the junction near the village. Beyond Finegayan, the principal roads led to Ritidian Point and Mt. Santa Rosa. While there was no indication that the Japanese would defend the northernmost point of the island, aerial reconnaissance, captured documents. prisoner interrogations.

and information supplied by Guamanians all pointed to Mt. Santa Rosa as the center of resistance.

Concerned though he was with the immediate struggle to break through the outpost defenses at Barrigada and Finegayan, General Geiger was also looking ahead to the capture of Mt. Santa Rosa. Once it had driven past the coastal indentation of Tumon Bay, IIIAC would be operating in a wider zone, one just as choked with jungle growth and as hard to traverse as any area yet encountered. Geiger planned to use the 77th Division to reduce enemy positions in the vicinity of Santa Rosa, leaving the capture of most of Guam north of the mountain to the 3d Division. Under the circumstances, the corps commander believed that he could make good use of the 1st Brigade in the final clean-up drive, which would narrow the zones of attack and enable Generals Bruce, Turnage, and Shepherd to employ their men to best advantage in the difficult terrain.

Oral instructions were issued on the morning of 2 August for the brigade to be prepared to move to the vicinity of Tiyan airfield in corps reserve. General Shepherd in turn issued an operation order at 1030 directing the 4th Marines (less two companies on distant patrol) to assemble at Maanot Pass ready to move north by 0800 on the 3d. The 22d Marines (less 1/22) was ordered to continue patrolling and to prepare to move on 5 August.⁷ Corps planned to shift responsibility for the

⁷ Adding an amphibious note to the reconnaissance along the west coast were several long patrols mounted by elements of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion. *Metzger memo*.

security of southern Guam from the brigade to a task force composed in the main of 1/22, the 9th Defense Battalion, and the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion, all under the defense battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel O'Neil.

Following its relief of the 77th Division, the brigade had sent out deep, farranging patrols to continue the hunt for Japanese stragglers and to locate and encourage Guamanians to enter friendly lines. The patrols were made strong enough-all were at least reinforced platoons-to handle any potential opposition. Although the Marines found a considerable number of defensive positions wherever units of the 38th Infantry and 10th IMR had been stationed prior to W-Day, only a few enemy troops were discovered and these were swiftly eliminated. On 2 August, a 4th Marines patrol moving toward Talofofo Bay ran across a group of about 2,000 natives, who were directed to report in to the corps compound near Agat. Civil affairs officers there were already caring for approximately 5,000 Guamanians, most of whom had filtered into American lines since 31 July. In the 3d Division zone, an additional 530 civilians were being fed and housed in a temporary camp, and the number coming in increased sharply as the Japanese retreated to the north.

The problems involved in handling thousands of civilians were new to Marines in the Pacific, but they were anticipated. Whenever prelanding civil affairs plans went awry, there was a will to find and apply alternate solutions. Much improvisation was necessary, the corps C-1 recalled, because the supplies intended for the Guamanians, which "were loaded on a ship with a low unloading priority . . . reached the beach after fifteen thousand civilians were within our lines." ⁸ As a result of this situation, effective emergency measures were taken. As soon as the first natives were contacted:

... every piece of canvas which could be spared by units of Corps, was turned over to the Civil Affairs Section and a camp was established south of Agat. 350 shelter tents were borrowed from the 3d Marine Division. The Army loaned tentage for a 100-bed hospital which the Corps Surgeon borrowed from the Navy. The Corps Medical Battalion made 250 beds available for civilians. A Marine officer was assigned to build the Agat camp. 36 military police from the Corps military police were assigned to guard the camp. Badly needed trucks were borrowed from the motor pool and from two to six trucks worked constantly at hauling captured enemy food supplies and materials salvaged from bombed buildings, including the Marine Barracks, All this was immediately put to use for civilian relief.⁹

The Agat Camp was soon crowded, but no one went hungry; everyone had at least a piece of canvas overhead, and adequate medical attention was assured. On 2 August, as it became increasingly apparent that there was no organized enemy activity in southern Guam, corps issued an order stating that all Guamanians living south of a line from Agat to Pago Bay would be encouraged to remain at their homes, resume their normal pursuits with emphasis on agriculture, and obtain food and medical attention as necessary

^{*}IIIAC SAR, Encl E (Personnel), p. 3. ^{*}Ibid.

from the Agat camp.¹⁰ As soon as priority camp shelter construction was well started, the Corps Service Group began to employ some Guamanians as laborers. Plans were laid to organize a native police and patrol force. The rough terrain of Guam offered ample hiding places for individuals and small groups of the enemy. It was believed that native familiarity with the mountains and jungle would be of great value in hunting down any holdouts.

OBJECTIVE: FINEGAYAN-YIGO ROAD ¹¹

General Obata, after surveying the positions his men had prepared at Barrigada, determined that they were unsuitable for a sustained defensive effort. Although he considered that the jungle maze around the village would be an aid to ambush and outpost action, he also believed that the dense growth would hinder the establishment of effective firing positions and would work as well to bar counterattacks. The army commander's instructions to Major General Tamura, his chief of staff, were to fight a delaying action at Barrigada to gain time for the construction of final defensive positions in the Mt. Mataguac-Mt. Santa Rosa area. The hard fighting at Barrigada on 2 August showed how well the Japanese troops could carry out their orders to

hold up the advance of the 77th Division in the eastern sector of the outpost defenses. On the 3d, the disposition of American forces, the terrain, and the roadnet combined to bring the 3d Marine Division into a head-on clash with the enemy deployed near Finegayan, guarding the western approaches to the final Japanese stronghold.

Ten days of hard-won experience had demonstrated that even the heaviest caliber guns had a difficult time making any impression on Japanese defenses dug into the rugged terrain of Guam. Where thick jungle cover added its mantle, the task of blasting out the enemy was doubly difficult. Impressed by the need to employ every available supporting weapon to maximum effectiveness, both Admiral Conolly and General Geiger took steps to muster a formidable array of ships, artillery, and aircraft to aid the advance to the north.

On 2 August, CTF 53 reorganized his gunfire support ships to cover operations along both coasts. Admiral Ainsworth, his flag in the light cruiser Honolulu, took station on the east side of the island with a battleship, another cruiser, and five destroyers. On the west, Rear Admiral C. Turner Joy in the heavy cruiser Wichita commanded a similar task unit, which was augmented by a third cruiser and four gunboats.¹² All the 155mm guns and howitzers of General del Valle's Corps Artillery were displaced forward by the morning of 3 August to positions where they could reinforce the fires of seven

¹⁰ STLF GO No. 5, dtd 2Aug44, in 3d Mar-Div D-1, 21Jul-10Aug44.

¹¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *IIIAC SAR; 3d MarDiv SAR; 3d MarDiv Jnl;* 3d MarDiv D-2 and D-3 PeriodicRpts, 3-6Aug44; 77th InfDiv OpRpt; 77th InfDiv Jnl; 1st Prov-MarBrig SAR; 3d TkBn SAR; GSDF Study.

¹⁹ The two battleships, *Pennsylvania* and *Colorado*, were detached on 3 August and returned to Eniwetok.

battalions of 75mm and 105mm and one of 155mm howitzers. Plans were laid to increase the aerial fire support available by supplementing carrier aircraft strikes with sorties by Seventh Air Force planes. The first deep support missions flown by Saipan-based B-25s and P-47s were directed against RJ 460 during the afternoon of the 3d. (See Map 30.)

There was heavy fighting in the 3d Marine Division zone on 3 August at RJ 177 where the roads from Agana and Barrigada crossed. Lieutenant Colonel Randall's 1/9 bore the brunt of the day's action as it advanced astride the road from Agana. At 0910, when the lead company (B) was about 500 yards from the junction, its men were driven to cover by a sudden burst of fire from Japanese dug in on both sides of the route. In a rough, close-quarter battle, two Marine tanks, an assault platoon of infantry, and plentiful supporting fire from all available weapons finished off the Japanese defenders at a cost of three men killed and seven wounded. Moving through the shambles of the enemy position, which was littered with 105 dead, 1/9 continued its advance on RJ 177. Continued opposition from Japanese troops hidden in the brush and ditches along the road was steady but light. By 1300, the battalion had driven past the junction. Shortly thereafter, as fresh assault troops relieved Company B. Lieutenant Colonel Randall received orders to dig in for the night.

On both flanks of 1/9, Marine units made good progress marked by clashes with small enemy delaying forces. The jungle and the constant problems it posed to movement and contact continued to be the most formidable obsta-When it ended its advance along cle. the coast, 3/3 was nearly 3,000 yards forward of the positions of the 9th Marines on the division boundary. There 3/9, now commanded by Major Jess P. Ferrill, Jr.,13 held up when it reached the Finegayan-Barrigada road because the battalion had no contact with the Army units on its right. At 1615, in order to plug the gap between divisions, General Turnage attached 3/21 to the 9th Marines; the battalion moved to blocking positions along the boundary to the right rear of 3/9.

As the Marines were digging in near RJ 177 late in the afternoon, an armored reconnaissance in force was attempted. Organized earlier in the day under the 3d Tank Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hartnoll J. Withers, the patrol group consisted of the Shermans of Company A reinforced by battalion staff tanks, two half-tracks from Reconnaissance Company, four radio jeeps, and mounted in trucks, Company I, 3/21 and a mine-clearing detachment of the 19th Marines.

Originally, the motorized patrol was scheduled to clear American lines shortly after 1200, but it was held up by the fighting at RJ 177. When the patrol commander finally got the word to proceed at 1525, it was already too late to reach its original objective, Ritidian Point, and return during daylight. Lieutenant Colonel Withers was ordered instead to try to reach RJ 460

¹³ On 1 August, Major Ferrill, who had commanded the Regimental Weapons Company, replaced Major Hubbard, who was wounded in the day's fighting.

before turning back and to complete his mission on the following day.

Shortly after 1600, the buttoned-up half-track leading the patrol point reached RJ 177 and veered right instead of left, heading east toward Liguan and Yigo. Approximately 400 yards past the junction. Japanese forces on both sides of the road opened up on the point vehicles. For nearly two hours the small Marine force was caught up in a fire fight and partially cut off from aid. The jungle terrain limited the maneuvering of American tanks and infantry and gave the advantage to well-emplaced enemy field guns and small arms. Eventually, covering fire from Shermans with the point was able to break loose the ambushed force. When the Marines pulled back to RJ 177, they left behind a destroyed half-track and a damaged truck and took with them 15 casualties.¹⁴ Marine tank gunners reported that they had knocked out one Japanese tank, two 75mm guns, and several machine guns.

The wrong-way turn at RJ 177 furnished ample evidence that the Japanese would dispute strongly any attempt to use the road to Liguan. The ambush also effectively killed the idea of a reconnaissance of the roads to Ritidian Point for the time being, as the enemy could be defending them as well. The risk was too great. Lieutenant Colonel Wither's force was disbanded after it reentered American lines and its elements returned to par-

ent units to take part in the general attack on 4 August.

Plenty of action after dark on 3 August underscored the resurgence of enemy activity in the 3d Marine Division zone. At 2200, two Japanese medium tanks roared down the Liguan road, crashed through the defenses set up by 1/9, firing steadily all the while, wheeled to the right at RJ 177, and sped west up the road toward Dededo. As they clattered through the positions held by 1/3, the enemy tanks continued to fire their 57mm guns and machine guns at any target that showed. Despite all the return fire directed at them, the enemy armor escaped. This incident was the dramatic highlight of a series of clashes, which occurred all across the Marine front in the several hours before midnight. Then at 2300, American artillery fire, "placed perfectly"¹⁵ in an enemy assembly area forward of the regimental boundary. was responsible for breaking up a counterattack. After this, Japanese activity died away for the rest of the night.

In contrast with the situation in the 3d Division zone on 3 August, where resistance was steady all day long, the advance of the 77th Division was marked by sporadic clashes with the Japanese. When the 307th and 305th Infantry Regiments moved out from their hard-won foxholes and emplacements at 0730, the enemy units that had fought so doggedly to hold Barrigada the previous afternoon had disappeared. In their stead, scattered through the jungle were lone snipers and small automatic weapons groups

¹⁴ From his examination of the enemy defenses which his regiment later reduced, General Craig concluded that "if the patrol had not pulled back when it did it would have been annihilated." Craig 22Jun65 ltr.

¹⁶ 3d MarDiv Jnl, entry of 2326, 3Aug44.

which were a constant irritant but no real threat to a steady advance. By 0930, the Army regiments had secured Barrigada and with it an all-important well, which could supply the 77th Division with 30,000 gallons of fresh water daily. After a pause to reorganize and regroup, the advance continued at 1330 behind a rolling barrage fired by all four battalions of division artillery. The 307th, with tanks breaking trail, struggled through the jungle, meeting little enemy opposition on its way to the crest of Mt. Barrigada. By 1500, 3/307 had secured the summit, and shortly thereafter it began consolidating positions for night defense.

The difficulties imposed by dense vegetation and a sparse trail network kept down the pace and extent of the advance. In an effort to speed the progress of the 305th Infantry through the lush jungle, Colonel Tanzola narrowed his zone of attack and covered much of the area between Mt. Barrigada and the coast with patrols. Complicating the problems of contact and control, the Japanese fought what the regiment reported was a "good delaying action."¹⁶ They staged a series of ambushes, which forced the Americans to deploy and maneuver against a foe that vanished as often as he stayed to fight.

The heavy opposition encountered at Barrigada on 2 August had caused the left flank units of the 77th Division to fall behind the Marines. Although some of the ground was regained on the 3d, when the 3d Division too was slowed by enemy resistance, at nightfall the corps line still slanted back

from RJ 177 to Mt. Barrigada. Despite persistent efforts by the 307th Infantry, the combination of jungle and Japanese had defeated all efforts to make contact. In late afternoon, a tank-infantry patrol that tried to reach Marine lines using the road to Finegayan was stopped by a roadblock and then a barrier of mines, both well covered by enemy fire. One tank was disabled and had to be abandoned and destroyed when the outnumbered patrol withdrew.

This encounter with the Japanese on the Finegayan Road had an unfortunate sequel on 4 August. General Bruce, anxious to re-establish contact with the Marines as soon as possible after the attack opened that day, issued orders for another force of tanks and infantry to push through to the Marine lines. This patrol, spearheaded by Shermans, blasted its way through two roadblocks and opened fire on a third about 1045. This time, however, Company G of 2/9 held the position, not the Japanese: seven Marines were wounded before the company commander succeeded in stopping the fire poured out by the tank guns.¹⁷ Even after this unhappy incident, which was caused by a misunderstanding regarding recognition signals, there was still no contact between Army and Marine front lines. On both sides of the division boundary, assault units had already moved well

¹⁰ 77th InfDiv Jnl, entry of 3Aug44.

¹⁷ The Army force was told that Marine units would identify themselves with red smoke grenades; the Marines, who were unaware of the significance of this signal, recognized the Army patrol when it began firing and hence held their own fire. *Craig 22Jun65 ltr.*

beyond the Finegayan road into the jungle.

In the 77th Division zone of action, where there were no roads and few trails paralleling the axis of advance. the main struggle on 4 August was with the rugged terrain. Shermans broke trail for the assault platoons of the 305th Infantry, and tank dozers cut roads behind the plodding forward companies. On the northern slopes of Mt. Barrigada, the soldiers of the 307th, cutting their way through the mass of brush, vines, and trees, could make no use of the crushing power of the tanks. Progress was agonizingly slow, despite the absence of any strong Japanese opposition. At noon, General Bruce ordered both assault regiments to concentrate their men in one or two battalion columns in order to speed passage through the jungle. If any mopping up had to be done, reserve units would handle the task. As if to emphasize the need for this decision. General Geiger informed Bruce about an hour later that III Corps was going to have to hold up the advance of the 3d Division until the 77th could come abreast. By 1710, when the 307th reported that all of Mt. Barrigada was within its lines, the forward positions of the two divisions were more closely aligned. Soon afterwards, corps headquarters ordered a vigorous advance all along the front for 5 August.

A factor contributing to General Geiger's order that held up the advance of the 3d Division on the 4th was the stubborn resistance of the Japanese defending the road leading to Liguan and Yigo. Assault units of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines hammered at the enemy strongpoints but made little headway in the face of interlocking fire from machine guns and cannon hidden in the brush. Again the lay of the land prevented the Marines from outflanking the Japanese or from bringing the full power of supporting weapons to bear. There was only enough maneuver room for about one infantry company to take part in the fight to seize the vital road.

Elsewhere in the 3d Division zone on 4 August, the 3d Marines was able to secure its portion of the day's objective with little trouble. The 2d Battalion stood fast in its positions near the coast. and the 1st Battalion moved along the road through Dededo to seize a fork where the branches continued north in two trails about a mile apart. (See Maps 29 and 30). Both units sent strong patrols forward of their lines to range ahead in the jungle as far as 1,000–1,200 yards. The reconnaissance uncovered a formidable array of abandoned enemy defenses facing toward Tumon Bay, but discovered few Japanese.

On the afternoon of the 4th, in a move calculated to take advantage of the widening division zone of attack. the 21st Marines (less 3/21) reentered the front lines. Elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions replaced the left flank and center companies of 1/9 by 1730 in the area between the Dededo and Liguan roads. While the 3d Division was thus redeploying its units for an attack on a three-regiment front. the 1st Brigade was completing its move to northern Guam. General Shepherd's CP opened near San Antonio at 1200, and the 22d Marines (less 1/22) completed its move into a bivouac area near Tiyan airfield by 1530.

On 5 August, the focal point of battle in the 3d Marine Division zone continued to be the Japanese positions along the Liguan road. Again the 9th Marines bore the brunt of the fighting in jungle so thick that at one point an American tank passed within 15 yards of a Japanese medium and failed to spot it. Throughout the day, small arms fire stemming from many mutually supporting dugouts and trenches whipsawed the Marine riflemen, and wellsited antitank guns slowed the advance of vital supporting armor. The steady attrition of three days' fighting had taken its toll of the enemy, however. By dusk, when a Marine half-track knocked out the last Japanese 75mm gun, 1/9 was firmly in possession of the ground that it had fought so hard to win. On the right of the 1st Battalion, 2/9, which had passed through 3/9 during the morning's attack, was also astride the Liguan road, having fought its way forward through the jungle against moderate resistance.


Neither the 3d nor the 21st Marines faced anything like the organized opposition encountered by the 9th on 5 August. In the center and on the left of the division zone, small groups of the enemy that attempted to halt the advance of the infantry were quickly overrun. When 2/21, moving along the road to RJ 460, was pinned down by automatic weapons fire, a platoon of tanks made short work of the enemy defenders, the crews of two machine guns. It became increasingly apparent during the day's advance that the Japanese did not intend to hold the western sector of the island in any appreciable strength. Reconnaissance by Marine and Army light planes spot-

ting for artillery and naval guns and sightings by carrier planes and the B-25s and P-47s attacking from Saipan pinpointed the Mt. Santa Rosa area as the center of enemy activity.

Although the assault units of the 77th Division found few Japanese during their arduous trek through the jungle on 5 August, there was no doubt that the final enemy bastion lay ahead of the soldiers. The flood of natives that entered American lines, the few prisoners that had been taken, and the supporting evidence of captured documents reinforced the reports of aerial observers. Much of the division effort on the 5th was directed toward moving troops into position to make a concerted drive on the Japanese forces known to be holding Mt. Santa Rosa and its outworks.

Committing the 306th Infantry at 0700, General Bruce ordered it to pass around the right flank of the 307th and attack in the zone formerly assigned to that regiment. Pinched out of the front lines by the advance of the 306th, the 307th Infantry was to replenish supplies and ammunition in preparation for a move to the center of the division zone of action and a drive against Yigo and Mt. Santa Rosa when ordered by division. The 306th, its attack formation a column of battalions, completed much of its planned maneuver on 5 August despite problems posed by the jungle, a lack of useful trails, and the maddening fact that available maps proved to be unreliable guides to terrain. With General Bruce's permission, the regiment held up for the night about 2,000 yards short of the division boundary after 1/306 and 3/306 had both secured





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portions of the road to Yigo near the village of Ipapao. (See Map 30.)

For the 305th Infantry, the pattern of attack on 5 August had a monotonous sameness with the actions of the previous day. Deeply enmeshed in the jungle, the two assault battalions of the regiment hacked their way forward behind trail-breaking tanks and halftracks. Direction was maintained by compass bearings, and when 2/305, in the lead, reached what it thought was the day's objective about 1400, it had to cut a trail to the sea in order to verify its position. The 1st Battalion of the 305th set up about 1.000 vards to the rear of the 2d, and both units. lashed by a driving rain in the forest gloom. dug in as best they could for all-around defense. In the area occupied by 1/305, the coral subsurface was only six to nine inches below ground level; no satisfactory weapons emplacements or foxholes could be constructed.18

At 0200 on 6 August, two Japanese medium tanks, accompanied by a platoon of infantry, came clattering out of the darkness and attacked south down the trail that led into the 1/305 perimeter. A swift outpouring of small arms fire scattered the enemy riflemen. but the tanks ignored the bullets and broke through the American defenses. continuing down the trail and firing at targets on both sides. Much of the heavy return fire ricocheted off the armor and added to the lethal shower of lead and steel that lashed the surrounding brush. After one of the tanks collided with a Sherman parked

on the trail, then backed off and crushed a jeep, both enemy vehicles turned and raced back the way they had come, firing steadily all the while. Behind them the Japanese tankers left 15 Americans dead and 46 wounded; many of the men were casualties because they had been unable to dig in and therefore lacked effective cover from both tank and antitank fire.

The grim saga of the Japanese tanks was not over when they broke out of the 1/305 perimeter. At 0630, scouts of 2/305 ran into them, too. In search of a better route of advance, the Army battalion was retracing its steps along the trail it had blazed on 5 August. Cannon and machine gun fire from the two tanks, which were protected by a small rise of ground, quickly swept the path clear of infantrymen. American mediums worked forward along the narrow and congested trail to join the fight, but the advantage was with the enemy armor in hull defilade. Tree bursts from the Japanese tank shells scattered deadly fragments about, pinning the American infantry to the ground. Eventually, an 81mm mortar crew was able to get its tube in action. find a clear path through the trees for its line of fire, and lob shells into the Japanese position. This silenced the enemy armor, and assault units that outflanked the tanks and came upon them from the rear found both abandoned. Three bodies were the only evidence of the defenders' strength. The cost to 2/305 of the sharp and unexpected clash was 4 dead and at least 14 wounded.

These two tank-infantry battles were the highlights of 77th Division action on 6 August. Enemy opposition was

¹⁸ Col James E. Landrum, Jr., USA, ltr to CMC, dtd 22Oct52.

light and scattered otherwise, and all units spent the daylight hours getting into position for the attack on Mt. Santa Rosa. The basic scheme of maneuver planned by General Bruce's staff called for the 306th Infantry to make a wide sweep on the left of the division zone, advancing as rapidly as possible in column to reach the vicinity of Lulog village north of the mountain. The regiment would patrol to the division boundary to keep contact with the Marines. The 307th Infantry, with most of the 706th Tank Battalion attached, would make the main effort. attacking to seize Yigo and RJ 415. before turning eastward to take the mountain itself. The 305th Infantry (less 3/305 in corps reserve) would continue its attack toward the mountain with the objective of seizing the high ground south of it.

A map overlay outlining this operation plan and projecting a new division boundary beyond Liguan was distributed to all 77th Division units on 5 August. On the same date, the corps operation plan, incorporating the basic scheme proposed by the 77th Division. was also distributed. There was no overlay with the corps plan, but its language clearly stated that there was a change in the division boundary, and gave its map coordinates. Unfortunately, the new boundary and that shown on the 77th Division overlay did not coincide from the vicinity of Mt. Mataguac to the village of Salisbury. The result was that "the zone of action of the 306th Infantry, making its sweep around Mt. Santa Rosa on the division left was . . . partially within the 3d Marine Division's operational area." 19

As part of its move into attack position, 1/306 closed to the division boundary northwest of Ipapao during 6 August and made contact with 2/9. The 3d Battalion of the 306th advanced to within 2,000 yards of Yigo, securing a large section of the road, which was to be the axis of the attack by the 307th Infantry. Behind the assault units of the 306th, the road was cleared of the enemy back to RJ 177. General Geiger authorized the 77th Division to use those portions within the zone of the 3d Division in order to move supplies and equipment from Barrigada dumps to the new forward area.

In late afternoon, while he was reconnoitering the site of a new CP near Ipapao, the 77th Division chief of staff, Colonel Douglas C. McNair, was killed by a sniper.²⁰ This incident grimly demonstrated the ease with which individuals and small groups of the enemy could avoid detection by mop-up forces.

The fact that many Japanese could hide out in areas supposedly secured by Army and Marine units was in part a result of enemy defensive tactics and American measures taken to combat them. Since 29th Division forces were concentrated along key roads and trails, 3d and 77th Division attack plans were adapted to meet this situation. As a result, the approach of the 77th to Mt. Santa Rosa was made by means of a few strong battalion and

¹⁹ Crowl, Marianas Campaign, p. 422.

²⁰ Colonel McNair's father, Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair, had been killed 12 days before by a misdirected American bomb, while he was observing an infantry battalion attack in France.

regimental columns, which smashed their way north through the jungle whenever trails were not available. On 6 August at 0900, General Turnage issued orders for the 3d Division to advance in column along the roads and trails leading north, patrolling and mopping up for 200 yards on either side in dense vegetation, and to the edge of first growth in more open country. As was the case in the Army zone of action, contact between Marine assault units would be made at designated objectives, usually lateral trails or road junctions. The attack formations ordered by Generals Bruce and Turnage and approved by General Geiger were designed to keep maximum pressure on the Japanese and to deny the enemy any more time to build up his defenses.

Early on 6 August, before the 3d Division altered its attack formation for a more rapid advance, the assault regiments made local attacks to straighten the front lines and reach a predesignated line of departure. The 9th Marines killed the few Japanese that were still alive in the ruins of the defenses along the Liguan road. On the division boundary, a tank-infantry patrol of Company G, 2/9 moved out to destroy an enemy roadblock on a trail leading into the 77th Division zone. Part of the defending force was a Japanese tank, which scored three hits on a Marine medium before being knocked out by return fire. Enemy infantry fled the roadblock and was hunted down by the Marine force, which killed 15 men before it turned back after reaching a point about 1,000 yards inside the Army zone.

At 1045, the 3d Division moved out all across the front in what was essentially a series of parallel battalion columns. No longer deployed in skirmish line, the Marine units made great strides forward against minimal opposition. The 3d Marines, with 3/3 in assault, moved ahead 5,000 yards, along the road to Ritidian Point. When Major Bastian's lead units reached the day's objective, the 2d Battalion came up and extended to the left, while 3/3moved to the right to contact the 21st Marines. After the new front line was occupied. 1/3 relieved the 3d Battalion in position so that 3/3 could shift to the right and pass through 2/21 on 7 August. This realignment was a preliminary maneuver to the entry of the 1st Brigade into the attack to the north.

The 21st Marines. like the 3d. shifted to a column of battalions when the new attack formation was ordered. With 2/21 in the van, the regiment moved 4,000 yards and reached its objective, a trail junction on the road to RJ 460 by 1300. Then the 1st Battalion moved up and extended to the right in rugged jungle terrain, while 2/21 contacted the 3d Marines to the left. The 9th Marines, with 1/9 preceding 2/9, followed a small trail that was the trace of the division boundary to the point where the boundary veered sharply northeast toward the coast between Pati Point and Anao Point. At this turning, 1/9 moved to the northwest along a trail that angled in the direction of the positions held by the 21st Marines. The battalion set up for the night without having made contact with 1/21. For the first time in three days, however, the right flank battalion of the 3d Division (2/9) was in visual contact with the left flank battalion

(1/306) of the 77th Division when the frontline units established their night defensive perimeters.

During the afternoon's advance, corps headquarters passed the word that its operation plan for the attack against Mt. Santa Rosa would be effective at 0730. 7 August. General Shepherd was notified that his brigade would pass through the positions held by 2/3 and 1/3 and assume responsibility for an attack zone that included the western part of the island and the northern end from Ritidian Point to the village of Tarague. (See Map 30.) Shepherd alerted the 4th Marines to make the relief of the 3d Marines battalions and to move out in assault the following morning.

In its narrowed zone of action in the center of the island, the 3d Marine Division was directed to continue its attack and to assist the 77th Division. which would be making the principal corps effort to destroy the remaining Japanese. Priority of fires of corps artillery and naval support ships was given the Army division. Targets assigned for morning strikes by Seventh Air Force planes were all picked with the aim of softening up the defenses of the key Santa Rosa heights. The heavy bombing and shelling of areas behind the enemy lines in northern Guam had been going on for days. As one Japanese survivor recalled the period, the bombardment was nervewracking and destructive, and often seemed all too thorough to the individual, since American aircraft:

... seeking our units during daylight hours in the forest, bombed and strafed even a single soldier. During the night, the enemy naval units attempting to cut our communications were shelling our position from all points of the perimeter of the island, thus impeding our operation activities to a great extent.^{x_1}

THE FINAL DRIVE 22

Before the 77th Division launched its final drive on 7 August, assault units of the 306th and 307th Infantry advanced to occupy a line of departure closer to the attack objectives. Twenty P-47s from Saipan strafed and bombed Mt. Santa Rosa as the infantrymen were moving out. The 306th Infantry plunged into the jungle, following trails that would skirt Yigo on the west, while the 307th guided on the road to the village and reached the last control point on its approach march by 0900. As the leading company of 3/307 was nearing this area, 600 yards from the road junction at Yigo, its men were harassed by small arms fire. The Americans deployed and poured a heavy volume of return fire into the thick brush ahead. Within an hour all opposition had faded away.

Once all units were in position on the designated line of departure, General Bruce issued orders for the general attack to begin at noon. In preparation, 10 B-25s roared in over the mountain dropping 120 100-pound bombs on the south slopes and firing 75 rounds at Japanese positions from nose-mounted

²¹ Takeda ltr I.

²² Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: IIIAC SAR; 3d MarDiv SAR; 3d MarDiv Jnl; 77th InfDiv OpRpt; 77th InfDiv Jnl; 1st ProvMarBrig SAR; 1st ProvMarBrig Jnl; GSDF Study; Takeda ltr I; Takeda ltr II.

75mm cannon.²³ For an hour before H-Hour, support ships pounded the heights and possible enemy assembly areas, and then in the final 20 minutes before jump-off, seven battalions of artillery fired a preparation on defenses in the vicinity of Yigo. As the fire lifted on schedule and the assault troops warily advanced, supporting tanks had not yet made their way through the barrier of troops, trucks, and jeeps on the narrow, crowded road. At 1215, the light tanks caught up with the leading elements of 3/307 about 400 yards from the village and passed through the infantry front lines.

Overrunning and crushing several enemy machine gun positions, the lights topped a small rise where the ground was sparsely covered with brush. A seeming hurricane of enemy fire struck the armor from hidden positions ahead, and a radio call for help went out to the mediums. When the heavier tanks came up, a raging duel of armor and antitank guns ensued. With their freedom of action hampered by the jungle, the tanks were channeled into the fire lanes of enemy guns. Two lights were knocked out, one medium was destroyed and another damaged, and 15 tank crewmen were casualties before the short, furious battle was over. Infantrymen that tried to outflank the Japanese strongpoint by moving through the jungle, which crowded the road, were driven to cover by deadly and accurate machine gun fire.

Suddenly, the fight ended almost as

quickly as it began, when the enemy force, 100-200 men, was soundly beaten by elements of 3/306. Moving from his position on the left flank toward the sound of the firing, and keying his location to the distinctive chatter of the enemy machine guns, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon T. Kimbrell, led a platoon of Company K through the jungle and rushed the Japanese position from the rear. Surprise was complete and the defenders were killed or routed. Other elements of 3/306 wiped out enemy infantry holding out closer to the village road junction. With the welcome aid of this flanking attack, which accounted for 105 Japanese, the 307th and its supporting tanks were able to sweep through the shell-pocked ruins of Yigo. As the 307th turned toward the mountain, 3/306 moved out up the road toward Salisbury. (See Map 30.)

The fighting near RJ 415 did not end until midafternoon, and when the two assault battalions of the 307th had moved into position to attack east, the day was already spent. On General Bruce's orders, the 307th dug in about a half mile beyond Yigo and made preparations to renew the attack at 0730 on the 8th.

On the right of the division zone of action, the 305th Infantry spent another hard day cutting its way through the trackless jungle toward the mountain. Enemy opposition to both assault battalion columns was light, but the rate of advance was maddeningly slowed by the difficult terrain. The troops ended the day close enough to their objective, however, to get caught in the fringe of an afternoon bombing attack; 2/305 suffered several casual-

²³ AAF in the Marianas Campaign, Operation Forager, Mar-Aug44, listing of 48th BombSqn(M) sorties. (USAF 105.1-3, USAF Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

ties from a misdirected bomb. The 3d Battalion of the 307th, strafed at about the same time, luckily escaped injury.

In an unexpected twist of fate, 3/305, in division reserve but under corps control, had one of the day's hardest fights. It was ordered to clean out the area near the new 77th Division CP. where Colonel McNair had been killed on the 6th. A platoon uncovered an enemy strongpoint deftly hidden in the jungle about 500 yards from the headquarters camp. A fierce fire fight broke out. Elements of two rifle companies and a platoon of mediums were called up to surround the Japanese. estimated at company strength. Six hours of desperate close-quarter fighting followed before the defenders were wiped out at a cost of 12 Americans killed and 21 wounded.24

The column of 1/306, which advanced on the division left on 7 August, made good progress after the noon jump-off time. When its leading platoons reached a trail junction near the division boundary about 1500, they ran into a strongpoint built around two machine guns and manned by 40-50Japanese. The fight to eliminate this opposition took much of the rest of the afternoon, with the result that the 1st Battalion set up for the night just on the edge of the area that corps maps showed as part of the 3d Marine Division territory. If 1/306 had continued its advance, it would have encountered elements of the 9th Marines.

The 3d Division assault troops met little enemy resistance on 7 August. With bulldozers and tanks breaking trail where none existed and attack formations narrowed to battalion columns, all three regiments reached and secured their objectives by midafternoon. They held up along a trail from RJ 460 to the boundary near the village of Chaguian, generally 5,000 yards forward of their line of departure.

On the right, 1/9 and 2/9 moved out in attack with the 1st Battalion in the fore. A few isolated enemy stragglers were killed, and signs of fresh tank tracks were found by patrols that scouted toward the 21st Marines, advancing in the center of the division zone. The 21st, with 3/21 in the van, found no fresh evidence of the enemy as it struggled forward along the scant tract of meandering trails. On the far left, 3/3 led the 3d Marines attack along the road to RJ 460. At 0850, a few enemy artillery shells exploded among the advancing troops but with little effect. About two hours later, the Marines discovered the source of this fire when the tank-infantry point found a 75mm gun posted to hold a roadblock. After a brief flurry of fire, the defenders fled to the north and the advance continued at a good pace. When it dug in for the night, the regiment was in contact with the 4th Marines on the left and the 21st Marines on the right. The favorable reports by the 3d Marines of the day's action added to an already optimistic picture at the 3d Division CP. General Turnage ordered all assault units to continue their advance to the sea in the morning.

The situation in the 1st Brigade zone proved equally promising after the results of the advance on 7 August were evaluated. When the 4th Marines attacked along the roads to Ritidian

^{*305}th Inf AAR, 18Jun-9Aug44 (WW II RecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Va.)



ARMY TANKS hit and aflame during the attack the Yigo village road junction near Mt. Santa Rosa. (USMC 92083)



JUNGLE FOLIAGE almost hides a Marine patrol from view as it nears Tarague on 9 August. (USMC 93894)

Point, its progress was so rapid that General Shepherd alerted the 22d Marines to move forward behind the 4th, ready to join the assault as the zone widened to the north. At a trail junction about 2,000 yards short of RJ 460, Company L of 3/4, was fired upon by an enemy 75mm gun, which wounded the company commander and two men. Α supporting platoon of mediums quickly demolished the gun and a mortar position nearby, and blew apart the roadblock they had covered. Inexplicably, the Japanese gunner had fired three ineffectual rounds of high explosive at the tanks, although over 100 armor-piercing projectiles lay nearby.²⁵ Aside from this brief encounter, little opposition developed. The 22d Marines reached a position behind 1/4 on the left of the brigade zone in late afternoon, ready to move into the attack on order.

The capstone to the good news of 7 August was furnished by planes of MAG-21.²⁶ During the day VMF-225 began flying routine combat air patrols from Orote, relieving Navy planes of this responsibility. At the same time, the Seventh Air Force command on Saipan was notified that Marine night fighters would take over all night air patrol duties. Although the Marine Corsairs and Hellcats were not slated to provide close support for ground troops, they could be called upon in that role if needed. With its own air defense garrison in operation, Guam was a long step forward in its development as a major Allied base for further moves against Japan.

Despite the cheering events of 7 August, none of the American commanders had any idea that the fight for the island was over. On the night of 7-8 August, it was the Japanese tanks, as it had been so often in the past few days, that added a fresh reminder of the enemy spirit. Harried by air attacks, artillery, and naval guns, the Japanese could not move any armor in daylight along major roads and trails, but at night, after the flock of Marine and Army observation planes had landed, the tanks could shift into attack position.

About 0300 on 8 August, the soldiers holding the northern sector of the 3/306 perimeter heard tanks rumbling down the road from Salisbury toward them. Three Japanese mediums with an undetermined force of accompanying infantry loomed out of the darkness, all guns blazing away. Alerted by the unmistakable clatter, the men of the 306th were ready and replied to the attack with every weapon they could muster. The enemy infantry was quickly driven off, one tank was knocked out by a rifle grenade and a second was stalled by heavy machine gun fire. The remaining medium abandoned the fight and towed the cripple away. Morning's light showed the Japanese losses to have been 18 men, including 3 officers, and the cost to 3/306 for holding its ground, 6 men dead and 18 wounded.

Unshaken by this attack, the 3d Battalion led the advance of the 306th on 8 August, heading cross-country by a narrow trail for Lulog. The few Jap-

^{* 6}th TankBn SAR, entry of 7Aug44.

²⁸ On 4 August, the night fighters of VMF(N)-534 had led the flight echelons of VMF-216, -217, and -225 from the CVE Santee into Orote airfield. Sherrod, Marine Air History, p. 253.

anese encountered appeared to be dazed and shocked by the downpour of bombs and shells that had preceded the attack. By 1040, the battalion reached the village, and patrols headed for the coast on General Bruce's order. In view of the slight opposition, the 77th Division commander had revised his plan for encircling Mt. Santa Rosa to include not only the movement of 1/306 along what was believed to be the division boundary to a blocking position at Salisbury, but also the advance of 2/306 through that village and on to the coast near Pati Point. As the 2d Battalion, following its orders, approached Salisbury, Marine artillery shells hit along the column and wounded several soldiers, an unfortunate incident attributable to the confusion of boundary overlays in the hands of the two divisions. The swift protest of the violation of his supposed zone of action by Colonel Aubrey D. Smith of the 306th brought an equally prompt and sure reply from the neighboring 9th Marines. This exchange led to the discovery of the cause of the boundary confusion and its resolution by Colonels Smith and Craig.

Before the 306th proceeded further with General Bruce's plan, the division commander saw a POW report—which later proved false—placing 3,000 Japanese in the area just north of Mt. Santa Rosa. A cautious view of this intelligence prompted Bruce to order 1/306 to close on the 3d Battalion at Lulog and 2/306 to stand fast in reserve 1,200 yards northeast of Yigo, ready to close any gap between the 306th and 307th Infantry.

A strong reason for believing that major Japanese forces were located in the zone of the 306th lay in the results of the 8 August attack by the other regiments of the 77th Division. No significant enemy opposition was developed by the 305th Infantry as it neared its objective; the 307th eliminated 35 bombardment-dazed Japanese on the lower slopes of Mt. Santa Rosa, but found no one manning defenses on the bare upper reaches. Patrols to the sea by the 305th and 307th uncovered few signs of the enemy.

Under the circumstances, Colonel Smith ordered 2/306 to fill a gap between the 307th on the mountain and the rest of his regiment dug in near Lulog. In the course of this move, designed to block possible Japanese escape routes through dense jungle, elements of the 306th and 307th mistook each other for the enemy troops and exchanged artillery and tank fire. Ten casualties were incurred before the mistake was discovered. After this unfortunate mishap, the night was quiet.

Less than 600 enemy dead had been counted in the two-day fight for Yigo and Mt. Santa Rosa. Since intelligence officers had estimated a tentative garrison strength of 1,500 soldiers, 1,000 sailors, and 2,500 laborers in the 77th Division zone, it seemed probable that many Japanese had slipped away into the jungle. Although all 7 of the enemy artillery pieces thought to be part of the defense had been accounted for, only 5 of the 13 tanks reported in the vicinity had been knocked out.

Some enemy elements, which might have been units fleeing the Mt. Santa Rosa action, cropped up in the zone of the 9th Marines on 8 August as 3/9, moving along the trail from Salisbury to the coast, met and overcame successive small pockets of resistance. By the time orders were passed to dig in, Major Bastian's men had reached a point about 800-1,000 yards beyond Salisbury. At that village, 2/9, which was following the path taken by the 3d Battalion, held up and established a strong blocking position. The 1st Battalion, in reserve, patrolled in the vicinity of Mt. Mataguac and killed 25 Japanese in scattered encounters. Colonel Craig, whose CP was located in the 1/9 patrol area close to the division boundary, notified the nearest Army unit that his men had sighted considerable enemy activity near a brushcovered hill just within the Army zone of action.²⁷ Available intelligence indicated that the enemy headquarters might well be located in this area.

In the center of the 3d Division zone, the 21st Marines passed into reserve at the start of the 8 August attack. Redrawn regimental boundaries pinched the 21st out of the front line, but gave it a large triangular patrol area, about 3,000 yards along each leg, to clear of Japanese. One patrol of the many threading their ways through the jungle discovered a truck, which contained the bodies of 30 Guamanians, who had been beheaded; in the same area, near Chaguian, 21 more bodies of natives, who had been as brutally murdered, were found the next day. Subsequent intensive investigation revealed that these victims had been impressed at the concentration camp near Yona to work on the defenses at Yigo. These gruesome discoveries spurred the Marines to a grim determination in

st Craig 22Jun65 ltr.

their task of hunting down and eliminating the Japanese.

Although there were signs of recent Japanese activity throughout the jungled interior, particularly along the trails, relatively few enemy were found by the 3d Marines moving northeast on the left flank of the division. The 3d Battalion, which could follow a trail along the boundary, was able to make rapid progress. It reached RJ 460 and moved 1,500 yards further to the northeast before holding up for night defense. Patrols found their way to the cliffs overlooking the sea before returning to the perimeter for the night.

The 2d Battalion was not so fortunate as the 3d, for the trail it followed in the morning attack soon ended in a wall of jungle. A second trail which was supposed to intersect the first, a narrow pathway leading from Salisbury to the coastal village of Tarague, proved to be 1,300 yards away through the brush. Major Culpepper had no choice but to plunge ahead into the tangle, with relays of men cutting their way through the mass of vegetation, in order to reach his objective. All heavy weapons were left behind to come up with the bulldozers and tanks that followed the trace of the infantry column, building a wider trail, which could be used by trucks and jeeps. When 2/3 broke through to the Salisbury-Tarague trail. a patrol headed south to contact the 9th Marines. Not far from the new trail junction, an enemy blocking force was encountered and a fire fight broke out. When the last shots died away, 19 dead Japanese were found in the remnants of the enemy position, but it was too late to continue any further south. The patrol retraced its steps

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and rejoined the battalion, which had moved north on the trail toward the coast. On Colonel Stuart's order, 2/3, still minus its supporting weapons, dug in along the trail at a point roughly two miles north of Salisbury. (See Map 31.)

Helped by good trails that paralleled its direction of attack, the 1st Brigade reached the northern tip of Guam on 8 August. On General Shepherd's order, the 22d Marines moved into the line on the left at the start of the morning's attack, relieving elements of 1/4. As the battalion columns advanced in approach march formation, there was little enemy resistance. Shepherd ordered 2/22 to send a patrol to Ritidian Point lighthouse, where air observers had reported Japanese activity. Company F drew the mission and advanced rapidly while carrier aircraft hit each successive road and trail junction to the front. By 1500, the company had reached Ritidian Point and had begun to work a patrol down a twisting cliff trail to the beach. A small force of Japanese tried to ambush the Marines but was easily eliminated. Following Company F, the remainder of 2/22 set up a defensive perimeter near Mt. Machanao. The 3d Battalion dug in on the road about halfway between RJ 530 and RJ 460.


The 4th Marines, experiencing little difficulty in seizing the day's objectives, set up night defenses in a series of perimeters, which stretched from the position held by 3/22 back down the road to RJ 460 and thence along the trail to Tarague as far as the defenses established by 3/3. Vigorous patrolling during the day had located few Japanese in the brigade zone of action.

That night in a surprisingly honest broadcast, that might almost have been a IIIAC situation report, Radio Tokyo announced that American forces had seized 90 percent of Guam and were patrolling the remaining area still held by the Japanese.

Emphasizing the closeness of the end on Guam, IIIAC had placed restrictions on the use of supporting fires since 7 August. On that day, corps headquarters cancelled all deep support naval gunfire missions except those specifically requested by the brigade and divisions. Those headquarters could continue call fire on point and area targets, but had to coordinate closely and control each mission precisely. The last strike by Saipan-based P-47s was flown on the afternoon of the 7th. B-25s made their final bombing and strafing runs on Ritidian Point targets the next morning.²⁸ After the strikes in support of 2/22 approaching the northern tip of the island, carrier planes were placed on standby for possible supporting strikes but never called. For the last stages of the campaign, artillery was the primary supporting weapon, and battalions of brigade and division howitzers displaced forward on the 8th in order to reach firing positions that would cover the stretches of jungle that remained

³⁵ During 24 missions flown against targets on Guam between 3 and 8 August, Seventh Air Force squadrons lost one plane, a B-25, which crashed in the jungle on 5 August, killing the six-man crew and one observer. It is not known whether the ship was shot down or had an operational failure. AAF in the Marianas, *op. cit.*; 48th BombSqn(M) Org-Hist, 1-31Aug44, pp. 1-2. (USAF Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

SEIZURE OF NORTHERN GUAM



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in Japanese hands.

On the night of 8/9 August, the center of action was the position occupied by 2/3 on the Salisbury-Tarague trail. At 0130, enemy mortar fire crashed down in the perimeter, heralding a tank-infantry attack launched from the direction of Tarague. The Marines immediately took cover off the trail and opened fire with every weapon they had. The fury of defending fire succeeded in annihilating the Japanese riflemen. The tanks continued firing and edged forward without infantry support when bazooka rockets and antitank rifle grenades, both in poor condition from exposure to the frequent rains, proved ineffective against the Japanese armor.

At 0300, when three enemy mediums had advanced into the midst of his position, Major Culpepper ordered his company commanders to pull their men back into the jungle and to reassemble and reorganize in the woods behind his CP.29 Miraculously, a head count taken 45 minutes later when the companies had found their ways through the dark jungle showed that there were no American casualties despite the prolonged firefight. Culpepper radioed Colonel Stuart of his actions, and as dawn broke, 2/3 struck out crosscountry, cutting a trail toward the positions held by 3/3. (See Map 31.)

As his 2d Battalion fought its way through the jungle, Colonel Stuart, whose CP was located in the 3/3 perimeter, bent every effort toward getting heavy weapons onto the trail where the Japanese tanks were last reported. Bulldozers plowed their heavy blades through the thick growth and tanks followed, crushing or knocking down all but the biggest trees. By noon, a rugged track usable by tanks and antitank guns was cut through to the Salisbury-Tarague trail. Leaving a blocking force at this junction, 3/3moved south with tank support toward the scene of the night's action. The enemy mediums had disappeared, however, and 3/3 set up where 2/3 had dug in the night before. At 1500, 1/21, which had been attached to the 3d Marines the night before, was ordered to move up to the trail and advance toward Tarague. When the battalion received the word to set up for the night, it was 1,500 yards from the coast. At the other end of the trail, 3/21, operating under regimental control, set up a blocking position at Salisbury. Completing the picture of a day of maneuvering to trap the enemy tanks, 2/3 reached the division boundary road after a hard trek through the jungle and established a night perimeter where 3/3 had been located on 8 August. (See Map 31.)

While the 3d Marines concentrated its efforts on destroying the Japanese armor, the 9th Marines advanced to Pati Point. With 2/9 leading, followed by 1/9, the regiment attacked along a trail on the division boundary and patrolled every intersecting path. The 3d Battalion in reserve sought the Japanese as aggressively as the assault units. About 1030, one of 3/9patrols fought the day's major action when it discovered a trailblock built around a light tank and two trucks. A sharp, brief battle eliminated all opposition and accounted for 18 Japanese.

Colonel Craig was directed to hold up

^{20 2/3} Jnl, entry of 8Aug44.

the advance of 2/9 in midmorning,³⁰ when a native reported that 2,000-3,000 Japanese were located in the vicinity of Savana Grande, a large, fairly open stretch of dwarf jungle growth, coconut trees, and tall grasses. Division artillery poured 2,280 rounds of 75mm and 105mm shells into the area, and the 7th 155mm Gun Battalion. the only Corps Artillery unit that could reach the target, added 1,000 of its heavier rounds in $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours of concentrated firing. When the 9th Marines moved out in attack again, this time with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, it found few signs of the enemy. Those Japanese encountered were guickly Patrols from both battalions killed. reached the cliffs along the coast by 1800 and scouted Pati Point and Savana Grande without results. When Colonel Craig ordered all units to set up night defenses, the regiment had made contact with elements of the 306th Infantry patrolling to the south.

General Bruce was satisfied that his zone was free of organized Japanese opposition on 9 August. Feeling that there was no necessity for three regiments in the forward area, he ordered the 305th Infantry (less 3/305 in corps reserve) back to Barrigada. This action lessened the strain on supply agencies, which were forced to use the road through Finegayan in the 3d Division zone or the rugged bulldozer trail that marked the route of advance of the 305th. The 307th Infantry sent out patrols from its positions on Mt. Santa Rosa, but the bulk of the task of eliminating the remaining Japanese was given to the 306th. While there was

³⁰ Craig 22June65 ltr.

little evidence of organized resistance, there were frequent clashes with small groups of Japanese throughout the jungle. Of particular interest were several ambushes that patrols from the 77th Reconnaissance Troop ran into when they approached Mt. Mataguac from the east and fire that 1/306 encountered moving in from the west. For the most part, the enemy troops there stayed hidden in caves and waited.

The northernmost part of Guam, that most lightly defended by the Japanese, was aggressively patrolled on 9 August. Brigade units met scattered opposition from small groups and snipers, but it was insignificant and easily overcome. The 2d Battalion, 22d Marines climbed down the cliffs at Ritidian Point and searched for the enemy along the beaches. The 4th Marines reached the north coast at Mengagan Point, sent patrols to contact the 22d along the cliffs and beaches, and scouted toward Tarague in the other direction. The patrol reports reaching General Shepherd from both assault and reserve units, and a personal visit to the regimental CPs in late afternoon, convinced him that his area of responsibility was secure. At 1800, he announced that all organized resistance had ceased in the brigade zone of action.

On the evening of 9 August, it appeared that the last strong pocket of Japanese lay in the 3d Marine Division zone. Plans were laid to make sure that it was eliminated early on the 10th. Once the troublesome Japanese tanks were accounted for, General Geiger was ready to declare the island secure, an announcement which would happily coincide with a visit of Ad-

miral Nimitz to inspect Guam and to discuss future operations.³¹

All night long howitzers of the 12th Marines fired on the probable tank bivouac area along the trail to Tarague and other paths leading into Marine defenses. Colonel Stuart gave 2/3 the job of tangling with the Japanese armor, this time with the support of the heavy weapons it had lacked on the night of 8-9 August. At 0730, Major Culpepper's assault platoons passed through the positions held by 1/21 and attacked toward the sea. About 400 yards up the trail, two enemy medium tanks opened fire on the point. A platoon of Shermans moving with the infantrymen returned the fire and destroyed the tanks. The advance continued past the pair of smoking hulks, which proved to be the last operational enemy tanks on Guam. Seven more enemy mediums, abandoned, were captured by 1030.32 The Marines continued on to the coast against negligible opposition with 1/21 trailing 2/3. When the cliffs were reached in the afternoon, patrols from both units worked their way down to the beach, where they quickly disposed of about a platoon of the enemy.

At 1131, shortly after receiving re-

³² The Commanding Officer, 24th Tank Company reported that these tanks were "scuttled" because of lack of fuel or mechanical failure. 3d MarDiv POW Interrogation Rpt No. 396, Capt Hideo Sato, IJA, dtd 70ct44.

ports that the Japanese tanks were accounted for, General Geiger announced that all organized resistance on Guam had ended. At 1423, a IIIAC operation order was issued, effective on receipt, establishing an enemy straggler line across the island from Fadian Point to the coast just north of Tumon Bay. All Japanese were to be contained north of that line and the brigade and the two divisions were directed to continue mopping up action in their respective zones against "numerous enemy remnants" estimated to be present in northern Guam.³³ The 77th Division was given a special mission of maintaining three motorized patrols ready on an hour's notice to reduce points of resistance south of the straggler line.

One final battle remained to be fought on Guam. On 10 August, when patrols of 1/306 checked the Japanese strongpoint near Mt. Mataguac first spotted by the 9th Marines, they encountered heavy fire from hidden cave positions. An earlier probing attack by Army troops, supported by mortars set up in Colonel Craig's CP area,³⁴ had been unsuccessful in penetrating the Japanese defenses. In a full-scale bat-

³¹ Unit journals show that all corps commanding officers were well aware of the pending visit of CinCPac and his official party, as typified by General Geiger's message to General Bruce: "Admiral Nimitz and other officials arrive from Pearl Harbor 10 August. Push all Japs from Guam." 77th InfDiv Jnl, entry of 9Aug44.

³³ 3d MarDiv Jnl, entry of 10Aug44.

³⁴ Craig 22Jun65 ltr. General Craig, vividly recalling the details of this action, noted that the Army battalion attacked soon after he notified them of the enemy activity on 8 August. The bulk of the fighting for the Japanese headquarters caves did not take place until 10-11 August, however, on the evidence of 1/306 records and contemporary Japanese accounts. Surprisingly enough, this hot action is very scantily covered in the records of higher headquarters. 306th InfRegt URpts, 23Jul-10Aug44 (WW II RecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Va.)

tle on the 10th, 1/306 lost 8 men killed and 17 wounded before it withdrew for the night.

Once his headquarters was discovered. General Obata knew that the end was at hand. Only three officers survived the day's fighting and a renewed attack in increased strength was certain. During the morning of the 10th, the Thirty-first Army commander composed his last messages to Japan. To the Emperor he sent personal thanks, not only for past special favors of the Imperial family since he had entered the military profession, but also his apologies for what he considered his personal responsibility in the loss of the Marianas. To Imperial General *Headquarters* he reported:

I accepted the important post of the army commander and although I exerted all-out effort, the fortune of war has not been with me. The fighting has not been in our favor since the loss of Saipan. We are continuing a desperate battle on Guam. Officers and men have been lost, weapons have been destroyed, and ammunition has been expended. We have only our bare hands to fight with. The holding of Guam has become hopeless. I will engage the enemy in the last battle with the remaining strength at Mt. Mataguac tomorrow, the 11th. My only fear is that report of death with honor (annihilation) at Guam might shock the Japanese people at home. Our souls will defend the island to the very end; we pray for the security of the Empire.

I am overwhelmed with sorrow for the families of the many fallen officers and men. I request that measures be taken for government assistance to them. The remaining officers and men have high morale. Communications with the home land have been disrupted today, the 10th, after 1200 hours. I pray for the prosperity of the Empire.³⁵

On the morning of the 11th, 1/306attacked with tank support behind a heavy mortar preparation. Although the few remaining enemy troops fought back with rifles and machine guns, the overwhelming weight of American firepower gradually silenced them. Working their way down into the hollow behind a shower of white phosphorus grenades, and under the cover of direct tank fire, assault-demolition squads used pole charges and TNT to seal the caves. Sometime during the morning's battle, General Obata, true to the code of Bushido, took his own life in atonement for failure to fulfill his mission.

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²⁵ Quoted in GSDF Study, p. 208.

Finish in the Marianas

By any rational standard, the most devastating cost of war is the lives of the men it kills and maims. In these terms, the price of Guam came high. In 21 days of battle Marine units of the Southern Troops and Landing Force lost 1,190 men killed and 377 died of wounds and suffered 5,308 wounded in action; the 77th Infantry Division casualties were 177 men killed and 662 wounded.¹ In the same period, 10,971 Japanese bodies were counted.² Sealed in caves and bunkers by shellfire and demolitions lay hundreds more of the enemy dead.

Perhaps as many as 10,000 Japanese were still alive in the jungles of Guam on 10 August. Except for the doomed group defending the enemy headquarters at Mt. Mataguac, there was little cohesion among the men that survived. In the months to come, when American troops in training for combat sharpened their skills in a perpetual mopping-up action, all Japanese efforts at counterattacks and guerrilla warfare floundered in a bitter struggle for survival. Starvation was a constant spectre to the men hidden in the vast stretches of jungle, and many of those that were later captured or killed were too weak to fight or hide any longer. For these survivors of the *Thirty-first Army*, Guam became a nightmare.

CHANGE OF COMMAND³

On 8 August, Admiral Nimitz informed Admiral Spruance of the future plans for the troops and commanders involved in the fighting on Guam. General Geiger and his staff were needed as soon as the campaign was ended to take charge of the landing force preparations for the operations pending against the Palau Islands. General Holland Smith was to be relieved as Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops and returned to Pearl Harbor to assume his duties as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. General Schmidt and his VAC headquarters were to assume command of all assault troops remaining in the Marianas. In discharging this responsibility, Schmidt was to report to Admiral Spruance and later when directed, to the Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific. Vice Admiral John H. Hoover.

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¹Army figures are derived from contemporary unit reports and those for Marine units from Headquarters Marine Corps postwar casualty statistics. A detailed unit casualty breakdown for STLF is contained in Lodge, *The Recapture of Guam*, pp. 178–180. Final official casualty totals for Marine units are listed in Appendix H.

² CTF 53 disp to ComFifthFlt, dtd 10Aug44 in *IIIAC Jnl*, entry of 10Aug44.

^a Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from ComFifthFlt WarD, Aug44 (OAB, NHD).

For the time being, the assault troops of IIIAC were to remain on Guam, but the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to depart soon for Guadalcanal, where it would join the 29th Marines and other reinforcing units to become the 6th Marine Division. Corps troops were scheduled to load out for training and staging areas in the South Pacific shipping became available. The as 77th Infantry Division, now blooded in combat and veteran in outlook, was to reorganize and refit as quickly as possible at Guam and prepare for early employment in another operation. Only the 3d Marine Division was due to remain for an extended period on the island it helped capture, but this unit, too, would be in battle again before seven months went by.

At 1030 on 10 August, shortly after the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines had accounted for the Japanese armor near Tarague, the Indianapolis arrived at Guam and dropped anchor in Apra Harbor. In the afternoon at 1635, Admiral Nimitz and his party, including the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, landed at Orote airfield and immediately boarded the Fifth Fleet flagship for the first of a series of conferences among senior officers concerning future operations in the Pacific. On the 11th, Nimitz and Vandegrift inspected combat troops and supply installations, and before returning to Pearl, conferred with General Larsen regarding base development plans for the island.

Most of the ships that had taken part in FORAGER had already departed by the time Guam was declared secure. At noon on the 10th, Admiral Conolly turned over his responsibilities as CTF 53 and Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) to Admiral Reifsnider. Conolly then flew to Pearl Harbor with key staff members to begin again the intricate task of planning an amphibious operation. Ten days later, Reifsnider in turn relinquished SOPA duties to a deputy of Admiral Hoover and sailed in the *George Clymer* for Hawaii. On his departure, Task Force 53 was dissolved.

General Geiger and his staff flew to Guadalcanal early on 12 August, turning temporary command of STLF over to General Turnage. On the same day, General Schmidt, at sea en route to Guam, reported by dispatch to assume command of all assault troops on the island. The VAC CP opened near Agana at 1430 on the 13th.

On 15 August, Admiral Nimitz' defense and development plan for the Central Pacific became effective at Guam. Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force was dissolved, and Admiral Hoover was assigned responsibility for operations at Guam as he had been for Saipan and Tinian on the 12th. On the 15th, as part of the change over, General Larsen assumed his duties as island commander.

One more step remained to be taken before the campaign for the capture of the southern Marianas became a matter of history. On 26 August, Admiral Spruance was relieved of responsibility for the Forward Area, Central Pacific and all forces under his command by Admiral William F. Halsey. For a time, Halsey's Third Fleet, using most of the ships and many of the men that had fought under Spruance, would carry on fleet operations against Japan. As Halsey characterized the change: "Instead of using the stagecoach system of keeping the drivers and changing the horses, we changed the drivers and kept the horses. It was hard on the horses, but it was effective." ⁴ Spruance and his veteran staff and senior commanders would resume direction of the planning and preparations for the major amphibious campaigns aimed at the inner circle of Japanese defenses.

ISLAND COMMAND ACTIVITIES 5

As the assault phase on Guam drew to a close. General Larsen assumed increasing responsibility for operations on the island. On 2 August, control of Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island passed to Island Command, and on the 7th, Larsen took over the operation of all extended radio circuits and a joint communications center. Supervision of all unloading activities was assigned to Island Command on 9 August. As garrison shipping arrived, the number and complexity of troops reporting to the island commander increased steadily.

General Larsen's initial task organization for base development included an advance naval base force, Lion 6, which was hard at work developing Apra Harbor as the center of a vast naval operating base. Airfield and

⁵Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: VAC WarD, Aug44; Island Comd WarD, 1Apr-15Aug44, 15-31Aug44, and Sep45; 3d MarDiv Jnl; GSDF Study. road construction and stevedoring duties were the principal assignments of elements of the 5th Naval Construction Brigade, which included 12 Seabee battalions and 1 Marine and 4 Army battalions of aviation engineers. Supply activities were concentrated in the dumps and salvage and repair facilities developed and manned by the 5th Field Depot. For air defense, Larsen had MAG-21 and four antiaircraft battalions. V Amphibious Corps assigned him the 3d Marine Division for ground defense.

To this myriad of responsibilities for building Guam into a major staging, supply, and training base for future Pacific operations. General Larsen added the mantle of de facto governor of the Guamanians. The civil affairs section of Island Command had approximately 21,000 men, women, and children to care for, and to start back on the road to self-sufficiency. The cultivation of native gardens and the revival of native industries were actively fostered, and hundreds of men and women were employed as laborers and clerical workers in the burgeoning port, airfield, and supply facilities.

To protect and supervise the Guamanians, Admiral Nimitz authorized the formation of an island police, successor to the prewar Insular Patrol Force. Formed from a nucleus of former members plus military policemen from Island Command, all under a Marine officer, the new Local Security Patrol Force performed normal civilian police functions. In addition, however, these men, and many other Guamanians who volunteered as guides to American patrols, took an active part in hunting the Japanese. Isolated native villages and

⁴ FAdm William F. Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan, III, USN, *Admiral Halsey's Story* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), p. 197.

farms were particularly vulnerable to foraging raids by the harried enemy troops, who were trying to keep alive in the jungle.

Soon after assuming responsibility for the assault troops on Guam, General Schmidt directed that the 3d and 77th Divisions each maintain an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion in the northern part of the island with a mission of killing or capturing the remaining Japanese. The 21st Marines and the 306th Infantry, which drew the initial patrol assignments, accounted for an average of 80 enemy a day between them in the last two weeks of August. On the 22d, the 3d Division passed to Island Command control for garrison duty and took over sole responsibility for the conduct of mopping-up operations; the 306th Infantry was relieved on 26 August to return to the 77th Division base camp.

While the patrol operations continued without letup, the majority of the assault troops under VAC command either shipped out from the island or settled into a rehabilitation and training routine with the emphasis on readying the men for early employment in combat again. The III Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion and the Signal Battalion left for Guadalcanal on 15 August. On the 21st, elements of the 1st Brigade began loading ship, and the veteran troops destined to form the new 6th Division sailed for the South Pacific on the 31st. In areas assigned by Island Command, the 3d Marine Division established its unit camps along the east coast road between Pago Bay and Ylig Bay, and the 77th Division encamped in the hills above Agat along Harmon Road.

The preparations of the 3d and 77th Divisions for further combat highlighted the role that Guam was to play during the remainder of the war. In addition to its development as a major troop training area, the island was transformed into a vast supply depot and a major naval base, and was eventually the site of Admiral Nimitz' advance fleet headquarters. On the plateau of northern Guam, where the final pitched battles had been fought, two huge airfields and a sprawling air depot were wrested from the jungle to house and service B-29s of the Twentieth Air Force, which struck repeatedly at Japan. A little over a year after the date that General Geiger had declared the island secure, it housed 201,718 American troops: 65,095 Army and Army Air Forces; 77,911 Navy; and 58,712 Marine Corps. Reunited on Guam for operations against the Japanese home islands were the 3d and 6th Marine Divisions, the former returned from the fighting on Iwo Jima and the latter from the battle for Okinawa.

During the period when the American forces on Guam were settling into a bustling routine of preparation for future operations, the situation of the Japanese hold-outs steadily deteriorated. Many of the men that hid out in the jungle were weaponless, few of those that were armed had much ammunition, and virtually none that had the means to fight showed any disposition to engage the Marine patrols. The overwhelming obsession of the enemy troops was food, and starvation forced many of them to risk their lives in attempts to steal rations. Gradually, as the months wore on, two

officers among the survivors, Lieutenant Colonel Takeda and Major Sato, were able to establish a semblance of organization, but for the most part, the Japanese that lived did so as individuals and small groups, fending for themselves and avoiding all contact with the Americans.

In the latter stages of the war, psychological warfare teams of Island Command were increasingly successful in overcoming the Japanese reluctance to surrender. On 11 June 1945, Major Sato, convinced of the futility of holding out any longer, turned himself in and brought with him 34 men. By the end of August, records showed that 18,377 dead had been counted since W-Day and that 1,250 men had surrendered. After the Emperor had ordered all his troops to lay down their arms, the Americans were successful in convincing Lieutenant Colonel Takeda that he should come in. On 4 September, Takeda marched out of the jungle near Tarague, bringing with him 67 men. A week later he was able to persuade another group of 46 men to surrender, the last unified element of the garrison that had defended Guam. Individual Japanese continued to hide out in the jungle for years after the war was over, despite repeated efforts to convince them that Japan had surrendered.

LESSONS OF GUAM⁶

The operations leading to the recapture of Guam, as an integral part of the overall Marianas campaign, suffered and profited as did those at Saipan and Tinian from the state of progress in amphibious warfare when FORA-GER was launched. In one respect. the extent of the prelanding naval bombardment, a standard was set that was never again reached during the war. In the Palaus and the Philippines, at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, gunfire support ships never again had the opportunity for prolonged, systematic fire that Admiral Conolly exploited so successfully.⁷ The destruction of Japanese positions led the IIIAC naval gunfire officer to observe:

The extended period for bombardment plus a system for keeping target damage reports accounted for practically every known Japanese gun that could seriously endanger our landings. When the morning of the landing arrived, it was known that the assault troops would meet little resistance [from enemy artillery or naval guns.] ⁸

Although a few coast defense artillery pieces and antiboat guns did manage to weather this shelling and the accompanying carrier air strikes, most were knocked out as soon as they revealed themselves. The devastation wrought among the 1st Brigade assault waves by one undetected 75mm gun at Gaan Point illustrated the probable re-

⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *IIIAC SAR*; 3d MarDiv SAR; 77th InfDiv OpRpt; 1st ProvMarBrig SAR.

⁷ Admiral Spruance noted, however, that both bombers and bombardment ships began hitting Iwo Jima at the time of the attack on Saipan, a program which was kept up "whenever we could" until the actual landing in February 1945. He stated that the time schedule between Iwo Jima and Okinawa was too short for an extended bombardment program. Adm Raymond A. Spruance ltr to ACofs, G-3, HQMC, dtd 16Jun65.

⁸ IIIAC SAR, NGF Rpt, p. 3.

sult of a less comprehensive target destruction plan. Where the enemy guns had not been destroyed, as was the case with a pair of 6-inch naval guns in the 3d Division landing zone, the murderous effect of area neutralization fires prompted crews to abandon their exposed emplacements.

The 1st Brigade, in its comments on naval gunfire, summed up the case for the assault troops—the more preparation, the better. General Shepherd recommended:

... in future operations the amount of naval gunfire placed on a well-defended beach upon which troops are to be landed be no less than that fired in the Agat area of Guam. If possible, a greater amount of ammunition should be fired. The same amount of ammunition fired over a longer period of time seems to be more effective than that amount fired in a short period.⁹

Once the III Corps had landed, the use of naval fire support was continuous and generally effective. In particular, every assault unit was high in praise of the system of providing frontline battalions a ship to fire and illuminate throughout the night. Star shells were as popular with American combat troops as they were hated by the Japanese. Marine ground commanders were impressed with the need for a greater supply of illumination ammunition; General Turnage asked that "more stars be made available for future operation,"¹⁰ and General Shepherd stated that it would be necessary to have "at least ten times the number of star shells in a future operation covering the same period of time as was allowed for the Guam operation."¹¹

Carrier aircraft were equal partners with gunfire support ships in the prelanding bombardment; they shared with land-based planes flying from Saipan the deep support missions delivered for the troops once ashore. During the operation, IIIAC noted that at least 6,432 sorties were flown, with 3,316 strafing runs made and 2,410 tons of bombs dropped. The scout, torpedo, and fighter bombers were most effective against targets that could not be reached by the flat trajectory fire of naval guns, such as the defiladed areas of Fonte Plateau from which Japanese artillery and mortars fired on the beaches and where enemy troops assembled for counterattacks. When the target area was close to the front line. opinions on the effectiveness of air support were varied and frequently critical. Admiral Turner characterized close air support at Guam as "not very good." 12

General Shepherd noted that because most vehicular radios, the only ones capable of operating on the Support Air Direction (SAD) net, were damaged by salt water, the brigade air liaison parties directed relatively few air strikes. Those that did take place were kept beyond a bomb safety line, 1,000 yards from the Marine front lines, because of "rather severe casualties to our troops from bombing by our supporting air-

⁹1st ProvMarBrig SAR, p. 19.

¹⁰ 3d MarDiv SAR, D-3 SAR, Anx. C.

¹¹ Ist ProvMarBrig SAR, p. 19. Out of a total of 106,110 shells (8,429.6 tons) fired during STEVEDORE, 5,039 were star shells. CTF 56 OpRpt, NGF Rpt, Anx II, App A.

¹² Adm Richmond K. Turner ltr to Maj Carl W. Hoffman, dtd 13Mar52.

craft." ¹³ The 77th Division had only one air strike directed by its air liaison parties, but the 3d Division made frequent use of ground-controlled strikes within 500 yards or less of its assault troops. On four occasions division troops were the target of misdirected bombing and strafing, and General Turnage recommended more accurate briefing of pilots to prevent repetition of such incidents.

The most crucial area of air support operations was communications. The SAD net was crowded at all times, and General Turnage observed that very few close support strikes were carried out on time or within limits set by requesting agencies. The method of operation worked out by Commander. Support Aircraft of TF 53 called for all requests from battalion air liaison to clear through regiments. He also frequently checked with divisions "since frontline reports from battalions were not sufficient to establish the whole front line near the target area."¹⁴ Once the air liaison officer had shifted to the SAD frequency, he adjusted the dummy runs made by the flight leader or air coordinator until the plane was on target. Then a single bomb was dropped and if it was accurate, the entire flight would follow and attack. The time consumed in request, processing, approval, and final execution was generally 45 minutes to an hour or more. Although the Commander, Support Aircraft considered the time spent justified by the success of the missions. ground units generally asked for more immediate control of planes by air liaison officers and for a method of operations and system of communications that would ensure a faster response to the needs of assault troops. In this conclusion. that air liaison parties should have more direct contact with supporting planes, the infantrymen got firm backing from the Commander Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, in his comments on air operations in the Marianas.¹⁵ He also pointed out there was a need for greater understanding "on the one hand by the Ground Forces of the capabilities and limitations of aircraft, and on the other hand by the pilots of what they are supposed to accomplish." ¹⁶ There was undoubtedly generous room for improvement in air support techniques, and this need was sorely felt, because when planes were properly used they proved themselves invaluable in close support.

To General Geiger and many other Marines, a partial solution to air support problems lay in increased use of Marine aviation. The IIIAC air officer pointed out that Marine bombing squadrons had clearly demonstrated their capability in providing close (100 to 500 yards) support to ground troops (notably at Bougainville while working with the 3d Marine Division). He commented "that troop commanders, whether justifiably so or not, have repeatedly expressed a desire that Marine Bombing Squadrons be used for close support of their troops." ¹⁷ In reinforcing this finding with a recommendation

¹³ 1st ProvMarBrig SAR, p. 15.

¹⁴ ComSptAirPac Rpt of Ops in Spt of the Capture of the Marianas, dtd 11Sep44 (OAB, NHD), p. 30.

¹⁵ I bid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁷ IIIAC SAR, Air Rpt, p. 4.

that specially trained Marine air support groups be placed on CVEs, the Expeditionary Troops air officer concluded:

The troop experience of senior Marine pilots combined with the indoctrination of new pilots in infantry tactics should insure greater cooperation and coordination between air and ground units.¹⁶

In assessing the operations of another supporting weapon, armor working directly with the infantry, both the 3d Division and the 1st Brigade were unanimous in praising the medium tank as the most effective weapon for destroying enemy emplacements. Point-blank fire by the 75mm guns collapsed embrasures, cave defenses, and bunkers even after enemy fire drove supporting infantry to cover. The 3d Tank Battalion, which employed flamethrower tanks for the first time, was well satisfied with the new weapon, but found that attempts to mount infantry flamethrowers on tanks were generally unsatisfactory. The 3d Division recommended that in the future one tank of each platoon be equipped to spew flame. Although the brigade had no flame tanks, it did successfully employ borrowed Army tank destroyers armed with a 3-inch gun which showed great penetrating power in attacking cave positions. Operations in northern Guam demonstrated that armor and dozer blades were an effective combination against the jungle. The Marines frequently employed tanks working in conjunction with bulldozers in breaking trails; the 77th Division found that a dozer with an armored cab was the

most effective vehicle for penetrating the heavy brush.

In general, infantry weapons proved reliable despite the weather and prolonged rough usage in the clutching jungle, but flamethrowers were easily damaged, with the firing mechanism a particularly sore spot. General Shepherd recommended that sufficient replacement flamethrowers be carried to the target to maintain initial allowances.

During the Guam operation, 3d Division and 1st Brigade experiments with the use of war dogs produced varied results. The dogs proved effective on night security watch and generally reliable on patrol, although they failed to alert Marines to hidden enemy troops on several occasions. Little need was found for the messenger dogs, for the SCR-300 radio provided reliable communications for isolated units. Patrols of the 3d Division found a new use for the dogs, though-investigating caves for hidden enemy before Marines entered; this technique proved best suited to the more vicious and aggressive animals.

Marine infantry battalions on Guam operated under a new table of organization, one that included in each rifle company the machine guns and mortars that had formerly been part of separate battalion weapons companies. The change worked well, gave closer support to the riflemen when needed, provided both company and battalion commanders with better control of supporting weapons, and simplified frontline supply channels. Since machine guns were prime targets for enemy fire, casualties among the crews were heavy, but replacements were found more eas-

¹⁸ CTF 56 OpRpt, Air Rpt, p. 6.

ily among rifle company personnel. The other important change in infantry organization, the 13-man rifle squad with its three 4-man fire teams, proved to be a harder-hitting and more flexible fighting unit than its 11-man predecessor.

Brigade and division artillery, closely trained with the troops they supported, were an integral part of a tank-infantry-artillery team. Most ground commanders echoed General Shepherd's comment that "artillery was the most effective weapon employed during the operation." ¹⁹ Firing batteries quickly landed, promptly registered, and thundered into action early on W-Day. Whenever the front lines advanced appreciably, the artillery followed. The 12th Marines displaced five times between 1-10 August, the 77th Division artillery battalions made four moves to remain in direct support, and in northern Guam, one of the 75mm battalions of the brigade moved forward five times and the other four. In all displacements, artillery units were handicapped by the 50 percent reduction in motor transport imposed by reduced shipping space; vehicles were frequently pooled to effect rapid movement and keep the

¹⁹ 1st ProvMarBrig SAR, p. 18. Ammunition expended by artillery units during the campaign totaled:

Unit	75mm	105mm	155mm
III Corps Arty 1st ProvMarBrig 3d MarDiv 77th InfDiv Total	42,810 45,235 88,045	 36,827 20,197 57,024	25,346 4,617 29,963

howitzers within supporting distance.

In the initial stages of the assault, the DUKW proved invaluable to the artillery units.²⁰ Not only did the amphibian trucks keep an adequate supply of ammunition close to the firing batteries. they also provided a satisfactory means of getting the 105mm howitzers ashore early in the fighting. Prior to the FORAGER Operation, the lack of a suitable vehicle to land the 105s in the assault had prompted the retention of the lighter and more maneuverable 75mm in the Marine artillery regiment. Colonel John B. Wilson, commanding the 12th Marines, now recommended that the remaining 75mm pack howitzer units be replaced by 105mm battalions. This exchange would give the division more firepower and simplify ammunition handling and supply.

The key to effective fire support was rapid and efficient communications between forward observers and fire direction centers. Radios were used when necessary, but wire was employed to carry most of the traffic. The 12th Marines found the use of a forward switching central to be "extremely advantageous."²¹ Artillery liaison party wire teams were required to maintain lines back only to a switching central in the vicinity of an infantry regimental CP; from there artillery battalion wiremen took care of the trunks to the fire direction center (FDC).

Centralized fire coordination was a feature of the Guam operation. The

²⁰ Infantry regiments also used DUKWs to land their 37mm guns and key command radio jeeps in the early waves, prior to the landing of artillery. *Craig 22Jun65 ltr*.

²¹ 12th Mar SAR, p. 2.

corps air and naval gunfire officers worked closely with the Corps Artillery FDC. Once his CP was functioning ashore, the Corps Artillery commander, General del Valle, was assigned operational control of all artillery on the island. This system enabled him to mass fires quickly and assign reinforcing missions as the situation required. In addition, he was able, in the light of the overall campaign picture, to make effective assignment of ammunition priorities, transportation, and firing positions.

General del Valle was not satisfied with the procedures used to get his own corps units ashore. He reported that his battalions were "prevented from entering the action ashore at an early stage with sufficient ammunition and suitable communications to render the desired support to the attack of the Corps during its critical stages." ²² In particular, he noted that the unloading was out of his control and at variance with the planned scheme of unloading and entry into action. He wrote that "as long as this control is vested in other officers, not especially concerned with, nor interested in, the operations of Corps [Artillery] satisfactory results will not be achieved." 23

Ammunition supply was a particularly pressing problem in the first days of the operation when the heavy 155mm shells and powder began to come ashore in large quantities. Shore parties were hard put to handle the multiple transfers from boat to amphibian, vehicle to truck, and truck to dump. Large working parties of artillerymen

were needed to handle their own ammunition on the beaches and in dumps ashore. The general recommended that an ammunition company and a DUKW company be assigned to Corps Artillery in the future to move ammunition directly from ship to battalion and battery dumps ashore.

Since no Japanese aircraft visited the air space over Guam, the antiaircraft batteries of Corps Artillery were not used in their primary function. The versatility of the guns and the destruction wrought by their firepower was clearly demonstrated, however, by their frequent use in support of ground troops. General del Valle drew particular attention to the employment of the 9th Defense Battalion in perimeter defense and in the patrolling in southern Guam as an illustration of the range of usefulness of antiaircraft units.

Many problems in landing troops and supplies at Guam were anticipated; others, as they occurred, were solved by combat team, brigade, division, and Corps Service Group shore parties. The effort to keep the assault troops supplied adequately required thousands of men, a force greater in strength than the 1st Brigade. The 3d Division had ship unloading details of approximately 1,200 men and shore working parties that numbered 3.300: the 1st Brigade left 1,070 men on board ship and used 1,800 on beach and reef; and the 77th Division, employing three battalions of shore party engineers plus some 270 garrison troops with low landing priorities, had 583 soldiers unloading ships and 1,828 working ashore. Almost one-fifth of the total strength of IIIAC

²² IIIAC Arty SAR, Encl B.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

was engaged in the initial shore party effort.²⁴

In allotting troops for the shore parties. General Geiger assigned the brigade assault forces a replacement unit. This organization, the 1st Provisional Replacement Company (11 officers, 383 enlisted men) was employed as shore party labor when the need was greatest. After the first flood of supplies was manhandled ashore, a fast-paced but orderly routine was established to unload assault and resupply shipping. The manpower requirements of the shore parties lessened, and the replacements were then fed into combat units as required. This use of replacements proved a sound concept, for it cut demands on assault troops for shore party labor and provided a ready source of trained men to fill the gaps caused by casualties. In later Marine operations in the Pacific, replacement battalions moved to the target with the assault echelon for use both as part of the shore party and as fillers in combat units.

Once the round-the-clock labor of the first 48 hours of unloading ended, the major portion of the task of handling supplies from ship to beach dumps fell to the specialists, the Army shore party engineers and the Marine pioneers. The Marine units proved adept at improvisation and in making-do with what they had plus what they could borrow, but they needed more heavy equipment. Corps reported that the pioneers:

. . . are grossly ill-equipped when there are any beach difficulties or obstacles to overcome. The organizations attached to Corps for this operation had insufficient equipment for reef transfer of cargo, clearing beaches, and building access roads thereto. Even though an additional 25 Trackson cranes were provided, these were insufficient for reef transfer, beach, and dumps. A large number of lifts were beyond the capacity of any cranes belonging to the organizations mentioned. Some organizations totally lacked lighting equipment, others had antiquated equipment with run-down batteries which could not be used when beach operations were put on a 24-hour basis. Fortunately, Army Shore Party Battalions had sufficient equipment to meet minimum requirements for all Corps beaches.25

A good part of the construction work that was necessary to maintain and improve the beach areas and dumps fell to the Seabees, who operated as part of the shore parties in both beachheads. Division and brigade engineers were primarily concerned with direct support of the combat teams. Road and trail construction in forward areas, mine clearance, demolitions of obstacles and enemy defenses, and the operation of water points were all part of combat engineering tasks.

One responsibility shared by Seabees, engineers, and pioneers was the maintenance of an adequate network of roads. Under the impact of heavy traffic, the existing roads disintegrated. There was a constant struggle to repair the main arteries and to build new roads required by combat operations. The restriction on cargo space had hit the engineer units as hard as any or-

²⁴ Total engaged strength of IIIAC was 54,-901, divided as follows: 3d Marine Division (20,338); 77th Infantry Division (17,958); 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (9,886); Corps Troops (6,719). CTF 56 OpRpt, Encl F.

²⁵ IIIAC SAR, ServGruRpt, Encl C, p. 5.

ganizations on the island, for much needed equipment had been left behind in the Solomon and Hawaiian Islands. Even when Corps Artillery prime movers equipped with angle dozer blades were borrowed, there were insufficient bulldozers and roadgraders to handle the tremendous road-building task. Frequent rains complicated all road operations, for mud prevented coral surfacing from binding and drainage problems caused an epidemic of floods.

Provident but temporary help was provided in this situation by the garrison force Seabee and engineer battalions, whose main mission was airfield construction. The profusion of difficulties faced by equipment-short assault units prompted the corps engineer to recommend that in future operations:

... a minimum of one engineer battalion with heavy grading equipment (a Naval Construction Battalion, a Marine Separate Engineer Battalion, or an Army Aviation Engineer Battalion) be included in the assault echelon of each Marine or Army division, or fraction thereof, in the assault forces."²⁸

The limitations posed by the lack of good roads and the chronic shortage of transportation hampered supply operations to some extent. Nowhere, however, was the course of combat endangered by this situation. When assault troops started moving north, units attempted to maintain a 5-day level of stocks in forward supply dumps, but there were never enough trucks available to meet this goal. The 5th Field Depot was able to supply all units and build up reserve stocks to 20-day levels in most categories. The necessity of

²⁰ Ibid., Encl B, p. 5.

feeding thousands of natives ate into the resupply rations, however, and the depot was never able to attain much more than a 10-day level of reserve food. Considered as a whole, logistics problems were competently handled and "the supply system on Guam worked smoothly and efficiently." ²⁷

One of the most heartening aspects of the operation, as indeed it was of other American assault landings, was the effectiveness of the medical treatment of casualties. If a man was hit, he knew that a Navy corpsman or an Army aidman would be at his side as soon as possible. Whatever the difficulties. evacuation was prompt; in the assault phase, the system of routing casualties from forward aid stations through beach and shore party medical sections to ships offshore brought wounded men on board specially equipped LSTs and APAs within an hour after the first wave landed.²⁸ Once field hospitals were set up ashore, many of the less seriously sick and wounded were treated on the island, but there was a steady flow of casualties via ship to base hospitals. Transports with specially augmented medical staffs and facilities for casualty care evacuated 2,552 men from Guam, and the hospital ships Solace and Bountiful carried 1.632 more.

The risks taken by the corpsmen, aidmen, and doctors in their concern for the wounded were great. The frequent

³⁷ Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War, p. 384.

²⁹ As the transport casualty berths began to fill up on W-plus one, however, some landing craft had to search for a ship which could take their wounded. BGen John S. Letcher ltr to CMC, dtd 12Jun65.

flurries of activity around aid stations. which were usually located on the natural routes of approach to the front lines. often drew Japanese mortar and artillerv fire. Enemy small arms fire often seemed to be centered on the men that were trying to save the lives of assault troop casualties. In the course of the Guam campaign, the 3d Division had 3 medical officers and 27 corpsmen killed in action and 12 officers and 118 corpsmen wounded: the 1st Brigade had 1 officer and 9 corpsmen killed and 1 officer and 35 corpsmen wounded. The 77th Division lost 10 medical aidmen killed and had 35 wounded in action.

An analysis of the lessons learned by Americans at Guam seems incomplete without the viewpoint of the Japanese on their own operations. A postwar study of their role concludes with the judgement:

... that Japanese troops on Guam took charge of the most extensive front as a division under the absolute command of sea and air by the enemy and checked the enemy from securing beachheads by organized resistance in the coastal area for the longest period, in spite of heavy enemy bombing and shelling for the longest time. In view of this, it is no exaggeration to say that this result was the best in the history of the war.²⁰

A further comment based on this study by a present-day Japanese general, writing in an article authored jointly with a Marine veteran of the Guam operation, points out a principle by which the defense might have been even more effective:

With no attempt to distract from the ability of the Japanese commanders, they

were forced by Imperial General Headquarters policy to 'defeat-the-enemy-onthe-beach.' and accepted battle on two widely separated, and not mutually supporting, fronts. Their fighting strength was sapped by Col Suenaga's, and subsequent, counterattacks. These attacks, launched niecemeal, could only be indecisive. If Gen Takashina had defended the vital area of Guam, Apra Harbor, he would have seriously delayed subsequent U. S. operations. By so doing he could have delayed the devastating B-29 raids on his homeland. Instead he located his forces behind the landing areas and thus violated the cardinal rule of island defense-defend the vital area.³⁰

CENTRAL PACIFIC PROVING GROUND

In a little more than nine months. November 1943 to August 1944, the art and science of amphibious warfare made enormous progress. The knowledge gained had been dearly won by the thousands of Americans killed and the many wounded between D-Day at Tarawa and the end of organized resistance at Guam. Each step of the way revealed weaknesses which required correction and problems which required answers. This crucial period of the war was a time when the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Areas discovered-by trial and error-the most effective means of wresting a stubbornly-defended island from enemy hands.


Tarawa was the primer, and from the analytical reports of the commanders there and from their critical evalu-

²⁹ GSDF Study, p. 215.

²⁰ MajGen Haruo Umezawa, JGSDF and Col Louis Metzger, "The Defense of Guam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 48, no. 8 (Aug64), p. 43.



CORSAIRS OF MAG-21 taxi down the airstrip on Orote Peninsula, 10 days after the island was secured. (USMC 92396)



B-29s returning from a strike on Japan approach North Field, which was wrested from the jungle battleground of northern Guam. (USAF 59056AC)

ation of what went wrong, of what needed improvement, and of what techniques and equipment proved out in combat, came a tremendous outpouring of lessons learned. The development of the LVT(A) was expedited to provide close-in fire support for assault waves, and the value of the LVT was emphasized and its role expanded in future operations. Deficiencies in naval gunfire and aerial bombardment were pinpointed, and measures were taken to improve the delivery and effectiveness of both prelanding bombardment and fire support once the assault troops were ashore. The shortcomings of communications between ship and shore and air and ground drew particular attention, and the training and equipment of air and naval gunfire liaison

teams was improved and intensified. The performance of the fast carrier task forces in the Gilberts campaign clearly demonstrated that Americans had the power to isolate a target area, protect the amphibious forces, and permit a longer and more thorough softening-up of the objective. The carriers provided the means to keep the enemy off-balance, and with the voracious submarines that ranged the Japanese shipping lanes, choked off reinforcements and defensive supplies. From Tarawa onward, as one Japanese admiral said: "Everywhere, I think, you attacked before the defense was ready. You came more quickly than we expected." ³¹

The carrier attack on Truk convinced the enemy that its vaunted naval base was vulnerable and therefore useless, and the fact that Truk was of no value to the Japanese meant "that its seizure was abandoned as a U.S. objective." 32 The momentum generated by the drive into the Marshalls at Kwajalein and the quickly planned and executed capture of Eniwetok was rewarding. The time of the attack on the Marianas was advanced by months. The swiftly rising power of Admiral Nimitz' forces, born as much of experience as of new strength, gave meaning to the principle formulated by the foremost naval historian of the war, Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, who stated that "the closer that one offensive steps on another's heels, the greater will be the enemy's loss and confusion, and the less one's own." 33

Problems of coordination and control in the ship-to-shore movement and in operations ashore cropped up in the Marshalls as they had in the Gilberts, but the difficulties had less effect and pointed the way to better solutions. Naval gunfire was measurably more effective, artillery was used to good account from offshore islands at most objectives, and prelanding aerial strikes were better briefed and exe-Air support techniques and cuted. communications procedures remained a worrisome trouble spot in need of improvement. As the LVT had starred at Tarawa, the DUKW shone at Kwajalein, where its performance marked the growth of a family of amphibious vehicles which eased the problems posed by Pacific reefs.

A floating service squadron based in the Marshalls, which could replenish

^{at} USSBS Interrogation No. 429, Adm Kishisaburo Nomura, IJN, II, p. 387.

³² Moore ltr.

³⁸ Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 341.

and repair fleet units, vastly extended the range and duration of fast carrier operations and justified the decision to expedite the decisive thrust into the Marianas. Amphibious planners, sparked by Admirals Spruance and Turner, merged assault and base development plans into a unified whole which ensured a continued rapid advance to the ultimate objective, Japan. The spring and summer of 1944 saw the flowering of a vital skill, logistics planning, whose incredible complexity met the need to sustain massive assaults and at the same time provided a continuous flow of men, supplies, and equipment for a host of existing and future requirements.

The attack on Saipan and the following operations at Tinian and Guam demonstrated the ability of a Marine headquarters to operate above corps level and to prosecute successfully a variety of land campaigns on objectives larger than the fortress atolls. Admiral Spruance's plan, like all Fifth Fleet operations plans in amphibious campaigns, provided for action to be taken in case of attack by a major enemy naval force.³⁴ This foresight was in good part responsible for the favorable result of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which Admiral King noted:

... crippled Japanese naval aviation for the remainder of the war. Planes could be replaced, pilots could not, and, as was discovered later in the year at the Battle for Leyte Gulf, the Japanese no longer had the trained and seasoned aviators that were necessary for successful operations against our fleet.³⁵

The fact that the attack on Saipan lured the Japanese carriers to defeat might alone be enough to call it the decisive operation of the Central Pacific campaign. The capture of the island, however, meant far more. It toppled the war party government of Premier Tojo in Japan, ensured the success of operations against Tinian and Guam, and secured the prime objective—the very long range bomber fields from which B-29s could ravage Japan.

A new pattern of Japanese defense. made possible by room to maneuver. emerged on Saipan. After beach positions fell, the enemy withdrew fighting to final defenses with the sole aim of making the battle as costly as possible to the Americans. The losses suffered by VAC were heavy but unavoidable against a determined foe. When the turn of Tinian came, every effort was bent towards improving the fire support from air and naval gunfire to limit American casualties. Artillery pounded the smaller island for days. and, under the cover of intensive supporting fires, a masterful shore-to-shore assault hit the Japanese defenses from an unexpected front. The result was a quick ending to a battle that might well have claimed the lives of many more Marines than those that did fall.

Intelligence gained at Saipan of the strength and probable defensive tactics of the 29th Division on Guam was instrumental in lengthening and increas-

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³⁴ Admiral Spruance did not expect "the Japanese fleet would come out to attack us, primarily because I thought the enemy would want shore based air support; and I knew that the first thing we would do in the Marianas would be to take out all of the enemy aircraft, and thereafter keep them out." Spruance 16Jun65 ltr, op. cit.

³⁵ King and Whitehill, Naval Record, p. 559.

ing the effectiveness of preliminary air and naval gunfire bombardment against the largest of the three Marianas target islands. Contemporary Japanese testimony amply supports the conclusion that this fire severely disrupted defensive preparations. Although the dual landings and subsequent operations in the rugged terrain ashore posed difficult problems of coordination and control, IIIAC units readily adapted their tactics to meet the enemy defense. The seizure of this island gave the Navy a base that by the end of the war was capable of supporting one-third of the Pacific fleet and provided the Army Air Forces additional B-29 bases for the aerial campaign against Japan.

In the Marianas as well as in the Gilberts and Marshalls, one aspect of the operations remained unsatisfactoryair support of ground troops. The complex and crowded communications setup caused multiple problems, inadequate pilot briefing led to inaccuracy, and, most important from the point of view of ground commanders, slow response to strike requests made air a far less effective supporting weapon than it might have been. The recognition of the need for improvement was not confined to the men that were supported, for a veteran Navy bombing squadron commander reported to CinCPac:

> In the Guam and Saipan operations, close support was actually almost nonexistent. Beyond tactical support by bombing before the troops landed, and some strategical bombing of rear areas and communications during the battles, little help was actually given the troops on the front lines. It is believed that the entire system must be changed and streamlined to make possible the real

Close Support that we are capable of giving the troops.³⁰

Marine commanders pressed hard for increased use of Marine air in close support. They wanted pilots, planes, and a control system oriented to ground needs and quickly responsive to strike requests. The winds of change were in the air in the summer of 1944 and refinements in close support techniques were coming. Operations later in the year saw planes bombing and strafing closer to frontline positions and evidenced a steady increase in the employment of Marine squadrons in this task as well as in air-to-air operations. Admiral Nimitz, in his comments on operations in the Marianas, noted:

Four CVE's have been designated for close (troop) support and will embark Marine aircraft squadrons. It is not anticipated that Marine squadrons will furnish all close air support but they will be used with Marine divisions when the situation permits. In addition a certain number of Marine aviators are being assigned to the various amphibious force flagships to assist in the control of support aircraft.⁵⁷

³⁰ CO VB-14 ltr to CinCPac, dtd 31Jul44, Encl I to CO USS Wasp AR, 6-30Jul44, dtd 31Jul44 (OAB, NHD). In contrast to this comment, General Shoup, chief of staff of the 2d Marine Division on Saipan, stated on 21 February 1963: "I might say openly that the finest close air support for ground troops that I experienced in World War II came from Navy squadrons at Saipan." 88th Congress, 1st Session, Department of Defense Appropriations 1964, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (Washington, 1963), pt. 2, p. 383.

^{sr} CominCh, *The Marianas*, p. 2–8. The operations of Marine squadrons on board CVEs and fast carriers will be covered in the fifth volume of this series.

At the conclusion of the Marianas campaign, senior commanders were generally satisfied that their forces were experts in the techniques of the amphibious assault and veterans in the flexibility of response it required. The admirals and generals were far from complacent, however, for the operations ahead promised to be even more demanding, bigger in scope, and perhaps tougher and more costly. In joint operations, despite occasional and human friction, forces of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had worked well together and learned from each other. There was a will to win that overrode every disagreement and setback, a pervading spirit of "let's get on with the job."

In assessing the performance of the Marines in this period, General Vandegrift, writing as Commandant to his predecessor, General Thomas Holcomb, summarized an inspection trip in the Pacific, pointing out that he had:

... covered 22,000 miles in eighteen days, saw all the force, corps, and division commanders and practically all the regimental and battalion commanders in the field. I went to Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, getting to Guam just before the show was over. Our people did a superb job on all three of those islands. . . .⁹⁶

That comment could as well apply to every man, of whatever service, that played a part in the success of GAL-VANIC, FLINTLOCK, CATCHPOLE, and FORAGER. Our people did a superb job.

³⁸ LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Gen Thomas Holcomb, dtd 5Sep44 (Vandegrift Correspondence File).

Bibliographical Notes

This history is based principally upon official Marine Corps records: the reports, diaries, journals, orders, plans, etc., of the units and commands involved in the operations described. Records of the other armed services have been consulted where they were pertinent. On matters pertaining to activities at high strategic levels, the authors consulted the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to cover the inevitable gaps and inadequacies that occur in the sources consulted, extensive use has been made of the knowledge of key participants in the actions described. These men, representing all services, have been generous with their time in answering specific queries, in making themselves available for interviews, and in commenting critically on draft manuscripts, not only of this volume but also of preliminary monographs. The historical offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have made detailed reviews of draft chapters and furnished much material of value to the history. The War History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan has read and commented upon the passages bearing on Japanese operations and provided worthwhile information that has been incorporated into the narrative.

Because this volume deals with the whole of the naval campaign in the Central Pacific, many of the records used relate to more than one of the operations. This is particularly true of the material concerning FORAGER. Such sources have been fully cited in the text and are discussed in relation to the particular operation where they have the most pertinency. All records cited, unless otherwise noted, are on file at, or obtainable through, the Archives of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

A number of published works of general interest have been consulted frequently in the writing of this volume. The more important of these are listed below.

Books

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, eds. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944—The Army Air Forces in World War II, v. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950. The Air Force official history covering the period of the Central Pacific campaign. Well documented, the book is a reliable source for the actions of the Seventh Air Force and the attitudes and decisions of its commanders.

Philip A. Crowl. Campaign in the Marianas —The War in The Pacific—United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960. The Army official history of the operations in the Marianas with considerable detail of the actions of the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions. It provides a well-reasoned analysis of the Smith against Smith controversy and is particularly useful for its sections on strategic background and planning.

Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. This official Army history necessarily deals with Marine and Navy actions to a large extent with emphasis on the lessons of amphibious warfare learned in the early Central Pacific operations. It provides a good small unit narrative of Army participation in the Makin, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok fighting.

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. An essential source for the study of the development of amphibious tactics and techniques and their application in the Pacific in World War II.

Takushiro Hattori. Dai Toa Senso Zenshi [The Complete History of the Greater East

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Asia War]. Tokyo: Matsu Publishing Company, 1955. A manuscript translation of this excellent study is available at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. The author, a ranking staff officer during the war and an historian afterwards, has written a comprehensive history which contains enough detail to provide a useful strategic review from the Japanese viewpoint of every major campaign of the war.

Samuel Eliot Morison. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. v. VII, VIII. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951, 1953. These two volumes by Rear Admiral Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 and New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944, comprise a highly readable account of Navy operations in the Central Pacific. Written with considerable assistance and cooperation from the Navy, the histories are, however, very much the personalized work of the author and are most effective in their descriptions of naval actions and of Japanese operations.

Robert Sherrod. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. Although this is an unofficial history, it was written with substantial Marine Corps research support and contains valuable aviation unit historical data unavailable elsewhere. Much of the very readable text is based upon interviews and eyewitness accounts that were not retained for later study.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. The Campaigns of the Pacific War and Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. Together these three volumes give an interesting account of the Japanese side of the war; however, they were prepared too soon after the event and contain many inaccuracies. The books are most useful in providing an understanding of Japanese military thinking through interviews and translations of relevant documents.

The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall. Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. A convenient compilation of the official reports of the chiefs of the armed services issued during and just after the war, which provides an excellent overall review of operations.

PART I

LAUNCHING THE CENTRAL PACIFIC OFFENSIVE

Official Documents

Fairly complete sets of the earlier ORANGE plans have been retained by the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy. Included in this collection are many studies and lectures which aid in tracing the development of Pacific strategy. At the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Virginia, the World War II Records Division holds the files of the War Plans Division, War Department, which contain an accumulation of drafts of ORANGE Plans submitted between 1923 and 1928. Aside from Major Earl H. Ellis' Operation Plan 712, his "Security of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations," and a collection of tactical plans drawn up during the 1930s, the Archives of the Marine Corps Historical Branch contain little material on the evolution of American strategy.

Copies of the various reports and minutes that show the development of Anglo-American wartime strategy are available in the ABC Files in the World War II Records Division in the Alexandria Federal Record Center. The more important material contained in these files, and similar ones of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been published and analysed in both official and unofficial histories and is more readily obtainable from these sources by private researchers.

Information regarding the status of Marine Corps units and personnel, particularly officers, during the period covered is contained in various tables of organization, station lists, and status sheets for air and ground units held in the Archives of the Historical Branch. Registers of Navy and Marine Corps regular officers and combined lineal lists of Marine Corps officers on active duty, both issued periodically during the war years, are useful sources for personal statistics. Major depository libraries should hold copies of the registers, which were printed by the Government Printing Office; the Marine Corps Archives has a complete set of the lineal lists which were printed at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

Japanese Sources

In the years immediately following the end of the war, former Japanese officials working under the auspices of General MacArthur's headquarters prepared a series of monographs detailing Japanese actions in many Pacific and Asian campaigns and at the various headquarters in the home islands. In the mid-1950s, a number of these original studies were revised and expanded, again by knowledgeable Japanese. The monographs vary considerably in their value, but, on the whole, they are honestly presented and useful in gaining an insight of Japanese planning and operations. The Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, which has a complete file of these studies, has prepared an annotated guide and index, Guide to Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies on Manchuria 1945-1960 (Washington, 1961), which is an excellent aid in evaluating the individual items.

Since much of the work done on these studies was in response to requests for information on campaigns in which the Army was principally involved, there is less available on the Central Pacific operations than there is on those in the South and Southwest Pacific. Almost all of the monographs of general scope, however, provide useful background information on Japanese war plans as they concerned the Central Pacific.

Books and Periodicals

The first two volumes of this series, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal* and *Isolation of Rabaul*, were useful in reviewing the role of the Marine Corps in the development of amphibious doctrine and in the opening stages of the war. Among a number of books and articles concerning Pacific strategy, the following were the most useful.

FAdm Ernest J. King and Cdr Walter Muir Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Rećord. New York: W. W. Norton Inc., 1949. Admiral King's autobiography covers his entire naval career and gives revealing insights into the character of the man and his contributions to American strategy.

Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942—The War Department—United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. An excellent background study of the formative stages of Allied strategy in the war.

John Miller, Jr. CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul—The War in the Pacific— United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959. The book provides a companion account to operations in the Central Pacific with particular emphasis on MacArthur's planning.

John Miller, Jr. "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy," *Military Affairs*, v. 13, no. 4 (Winter 49). A concise account of the happenings at Casablanca and their effects.

Louis Morton. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years—The War in the Pacific— United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962. Perhaps the best account of American strategy in the Pacific with considerable coverage of its developmental stages.

Louis Morton. "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," *Military Review*, v. 29, no. 9 (Dec49). This article contains much of the information on the ORANGE plans that was later developed in the official history cited above.

United States Army, War Department. Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. TM-E 30-480. Washington, 10ct44. A basic source on the organization and equipment of Japanese land forces with useful detail on weapons characteristics and textbook tactics.

Adm Raymond A. Spruance. "The Victory in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, v. 91, no. 564 (Nov46). An interesting but brief survey of the Pacific war with emphasis upon planning and strategy.

THE GILBERTS OPERATION

Official Documents

Although adequate material is available on the planning of Operation GALVANIC, the action reports of the units involved in the fighting both on Tarawa and Makin set forth only the general progress of the two battles. The message files and unit journals are very helpful in adding necessary detail.

All officers involved in the campaign devoted a great deal of effort to assessing the merits and defects of weapons, tactics, and amphibious techniques. The recommendations of battalion and regimental commanders have been, for the most part, condensed and included in the VAC Action Report and its many enclosures. Other important recommendations concerning naval elements appear in the reports originated by V Amphibious Force and Task Force 53.

As the Gilberts were a testing ground for many amphibious developments, comments comparing actions in later operations with those during GALVANIC occur frequently in Navy and Marine Corps reports. Any study of this operation should include reference to the action reports of higher commanders during subsequent campaigns in the Central Pacific.

Unofficial Documents

While writing the monograph used so extensively in preparing this account of the battle for Tarawa, Captain Stockman sent copies of his preliminary draft to various individuals who had taken part in the operation. Many of these men replied and their comments have been cited throughout this section. Similarly, the draft manuscript of this volume was sent to key participants and to the historical agencies of the other services, and the replies received have been used as applicable in revising the narrative. All such comments are retained in the files of the Marine Corps Historical Archives.

Of particular assistance in writing this section were extensive interviews by the authors with General Shoup, Admiral Hill, and General Julian Smith, who supplemented in this way their written comments on the draft. Admiral Spruance, and his former chief of staff, Admiral Moore, were quite helpful in developing the story of the planning background of the operation.

By no means all of the material uncovered by draft comments and interviews has been used in this book or in the Stockman monograph. The files contain much unpublished information that is of value to the student of the operation, particularly in regard to details of small unit action and the assessment of the accomplishments and character of individuals.

Japanese Sources

In addition to the Hattori manuscript mentioned previously, two of the Japanese monographs in the series held by the Office of the Chief of Military History have been useful. No. 48, Central Pacific Operations Record, Volume I (Dec41-Aug45), provided some data on the defensive preparations in the area and brief coverage of the operations in the Marianas, and No. 161, Inner South Sea Islands Area Naval Operations, Part I, Gilbert Islands (Nov41-Nov43), concerns the seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls and provides a general review of naval operations in the Central Pacific.

In terms of pertinent captured documents, the Gilberts provided far less material than was the case in many other operations. Few knowledgeable prisoners were taken. As a consequence, it is quite difficult to reconstruct the action from the Japanese viewpoint. Much of the information available on the conduct of the Japanese defense was provided by American intelligence officers who made exhaustive investigations of the ruins of the defensive works on both Makin and Tarawa.

Books and Periodicals

In addition to the works of general interest cited above, the following have been most useful in shedding light on the Gilberts campaign.

Richard W. Johnston. Follow Me! The Story of the Second Marine Division in World War II. New York: Random House, 1948. This work contains some vivid impressions of the fighting on Betio and considerable information on the organization of the division.

Robert Sherrod. Tarawa: The Story of a Battle. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. Considering the handicaps imposed by wartime security, this is perhaps the best account of the battle to be written by a journalist.

LtGen Julian C. Smith. "Tarawa," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 11 (Nov53). This story of the 2d Marine Division at Tarawa written by its commanding general is a valuable source for command decisions.

Capt James R. Stockman. The Battle for Tarawa. Washington: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, HQMC, 1947. The official monograph dealing with the Marine Corps role in GALVANIC, this booklet concentrates most of its narrative on the combat action ashore on Betio.

Capt Earl J. Wilson, et al. Betio Beachhead: U. S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. The combined efforts of several Marine Corps combat correspondents have produced an uneven, though at times colorful, book.

PART III

THE MARSHALLS: QUICKENING THE PACE

Official Documents

In general, coverage of the FLINTLOCK operation is more than adequate, but fewer official reports of CATCHPOLE have survived. VAC prepared a detailed account of the Kwajalein landings as did the other major commands that participated in this phase of the Marshalls action. Tactical Group 1 and Task Group 51.11 submitted lengthly accounts of the Eniwetok venture, but the Marine battalions that did the bulk of the fighting provided reports that do not measure up in quality. Unit journals of the 4th Marine Division and Tactical Group 1 are an invaluable source of hourly and daily action and include the substance of most important orders and periodic situation reports.

Piecing together a narrative of the battles for the islands of Eniwetok Atoll is somewhat difficult, for journals and reports of the fighting often do not agree in detail with the reminiscences of those who fought there. Such disagreements have been resolved in this volume in favor of the official records. Where journals and reports are incomplete, interviews and correspondence with participants have provided the information necessary to fill the gaps.

Unofficial Documents

The numerous letters and transcripts of interviews which originated when the draft manuscript of The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo was distributed for review were extremely valuable in the preparation of this account of FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE. In general, the monograph comment file has more detail on small unit action than the similar collection of letters and interviews gathered in the review of the draft of this section. Most of the participants queried during the writing of this volume were senior commanders and staff officers who could provide an informed and critical commentary on the treatment of the overall aspects of the campaign. Of particular use in this review were interviews and correspondence with General Schmidt and Admirals Hill and Moore.

The Office of the Chief of Military History assisted the writing of this section by making available the voluminous notes taken by Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall during and immediately after the conquest of the southern part of Kwajalein Atoll. These notes, together with similar material gathered concerning the Makin operation, provide a significant body of detailed information regarding Army actions in the early Central Pacific landings.

Japanese Sources

Japanese strategy is set forth in the Hattori manuscript and the two monographs, Nos. 48 and 161, previously cited. Another monograph, No. 173, Inner South Seas Islands Area Naval Operations, Part II, Marshall Islands (Dec41– Feb44), describes the efforts to defend the Marshalls against American air attacks and contains a journal with entries from 23 November 1943 to 1 March 1944.

During the course of the fighting, JICPOA received many captured documents, most of them diaries and orders originated in the 1st Amphibious Brigade. This material provides a revealing insight into life on a beleagured atoll as well as a knowledge of Japanese tactics. Unlike the story of the Gilberts battles, an account of the operations in the Marshalls can be fleshed out to become two-sided in terms of men who actually did the fighting.

Books

Once again Isely and Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War, Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, and Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls were invaluable sources. Among the other works which provided useful information were:

LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. and LtCol John A. Crown. *The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. This official monograph, which covers the operations in small unit detail, served as the framework for the account presented here.

LtCol S. L. A. Marshall, AUS. Island Victory. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1944. This book gives a vivid and detailed account of the capture of Kwajalein Island by the 7th Infantry Division.

Carl W. Proehl, ed. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Like most division histories, this book concentrates on personalities and highlights of action and training and gives the reader a good grasp of the character of the unit and its men.

PART IV

SAIPAN: THE DECISIVE BATTLE

Official Records

By this stage in the war, action reports had become guite detailed and informative. The basic accounts of higher headquarters, such as Task Force 51 and Northern Troops and Landing Force, bulge large with appendices and annexes which include reports of general and special staff officers as well as important orders and journals. The records of smaller units are also more comprehensive and uniform and journals of personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics sections provide far more information than any single volume can use, let alone a portion of such a volume. Saipan records are voluminous and sometimes contradictory, but on the whole furnish an excellent basis for an operational narrative. Where conflicts have occurred between the accounts

of different reporting levels, the version presented by the unit closest to the action described has generally been the one accepted.

A valuable source of information on the Saipan fighting and the Smith against Smith controversy is the report of the Buckner Board. Included in its many annexes, designated exhibits, are firsthand accounts of the fighting by Army commanders and revealing descriptions of the combat readiness of various elements of the 27th Infantry Division. A copy of this report is available in the files of the World War II Records Division of the Alexandria Federal Record Center.

Unofficial Documents

Unfortunately, almost all of the letters and interview transcripts gathered by Major Hoffman in the preparation of his monograph have been lost. A diligent search of every possible depository where they might have strayed turned up nothing. Since the monograph contains much material based on the missing papers, and many quotes from them, it has been used frequently as a source for the information they contained. Wherever this has occurred, the footnotes clearly indicate it.

The circulation of the draft of this section produced a fair amount of comments from key participants which have been used as appropriate. Admirals Hill and Moore again furnished most useful reviews and added considerably to the authors' understanding of the naval aspects of the campaign. Many officers of the several services addressed themselves in one form or another to a discussion of the relief of General Ralph Smith; none objected to the account in this volume, which has been written after careful examination of both partisan and objective versions occurring in other works.

An interesting source of informal review of General Holland Smith's accounting of the relief is provided in his correspondence with General Vandegrift at that time. These letters, part of a file of personal correspondence with general and flag officers sent and received by the Commandant, are held in Archives of the Historical Branch. General Smith's letters and his public reports concerning the relief are consistent in all important details.

Japanese Sources

Thousands of documents were captured on Saipan: many were roughly translated there and others were later abstracted by JICPOA. A considerable body of Japanese information in fragmented form is contained in the journals and reports of unit intelligence agencies. Prisoner of war interrogations are also useful, although the majority of the information gained in this way must be checked and rechecked because the prisoner accounts conflict sharply in many instances. The JICPOA translations, and those issued by Admiral Nimitz' headquarters as CinCPac-CinCPOA documents, contain a wealth of military and human interest data which must be researched carefully since the titles of the documents often do not give an accurate clue to the contents. A complete file of these intelligence papers is held by the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval History Division.

Among the Japanese monographs in the series mentioned previously, several give coverage to the Marianas though none particularly concerns Saipan. The most useful include: No. 45, History of the Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section (1941-1945), which gives an overall review of the Pacific War and contains appendices of Army orders and unit designations; No. 49, Central Pacific Operations Record (April-November 1944), which is concerned primarily with operations in the Palau Islands, but discusses activities in the other areas and gives contemporary estimates of the enemy (Allied) situation; and No. 90. The "A-GO" Operations (May-June 1944), which details the buildup of the Combined Fleet and naval air arm prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Books and Periodicals

In addition to the overall sources, particularly the Crowl Army history and the Morison Navy account, the histories of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions have been helpful in developing the narrative. Other works of value are listed below.

Gen Henry H. Arnold, USAF. Global Mission. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. The memoirs of the wartime leader of the Army Air Forces provide interesting back-

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ground on the planning for the Marianas and the establishment of B-29 bases there.

Maj James A. Donovan. "Saipan Tank Battle," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 32, no. 10 (Oct48). The author, executive officer of 1/6 during the battle, gives a highly readable description of the Japanese tank attack.

Maj Carl W. Hoffman. Saipan: The Beginning of the End. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1950. This official monograph is written in good style and considerable detail and gives adequate coverage to Navy and Army actions.

Gen George C. Kenney, USAF. General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. MacArthur's air commander gives an inside report of the controversy over Pacific strategy from the Southwest Pacific Area standpoint.

Edmund G. Love. The 27th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. Longer and far more detailed than the usual division history, this book gives a good insight of the emotional jolt caused by the relief of the division commander and the disparaging remarks published about the unit in the United States.

Robert Sherrod. On to the Westward, War in the Central Pacific. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945. Carrying on from his narrative of Tarawa, the author gives a news correspondent's view of the Marianas fighting.

Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch. Coral and Brass. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. Reliable for the personal opinions and actions of General Smith, these memoirs are not too accurate concerning details of unit combat action.

Capt James R. Stockman. "The Taking of Mount Topatchou," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 32, no. 10 (Oct48). Written by an officer of 1/29, this article gives a concise and clear account of the maneuvers and fighting involved in seizing the mountain.

Tadao Yanihara. Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. A mixture of scholarship and propaganda, the book is useful in reviewing the history of Japanese presence in the islands.

PART V

THE INEVITABLE CAMPAIGN: TINIAN

Official Records

Since the command structure for Tinian was basically the same as that for Saipan, although the commanders changed in some cases, many of the reports of higher headquarters cover both operations. Much of this material is contained in separate documents, however, as these reports, particularly that of Task Force 56, were issued in multiple volumes. Like the operation itself, the records of it are models. Following the general practice of the Historical Branch in all of its histories, discrepancies between unit reports were resolved in this volume in favor of the lowest reporting unit. All commands were impressed with the unique features of the operation, particularly the landing across the White Beaches and the logistical setup, and there is much discussion of these in the various reports.

At the end of December 1944, Admiral King's headquarters issued a booklet, CominCh P-007, *Amphibious Operations: Invasion of the Marianas*, that is a valuable synthesis of reports received from major subordinate commands regarding their part in FORAGER. Equally useful for its account of all three operations, the compilation furnishes an excellent review of the unusual aspects of the assault on Tinian.

Unofficial Documents

The file of comments gathered by Major Hoffman during the writing of the monograph on Tinian have not, like those covering Saipan, disappeared. They are available in the Archives of the Historical Branch for further reference. Senior officers concerned in the planning of the operation made extensive comments on the draft manuscript so that the author could give an accurate picture of discussions leading to the selection of the beaches and also emphasize other features of the operation that elicited the almost universal praise it received. In comments on the draft of this section, many of the same men called attention to their earlier detailed remarks regarding the monograph and limited their review to a discussion of the overall aspects of the campaign as presented here. Many of the veterans of the amphibious development stages of the 1930s evaluated Tinian as a classic or a textbook example for the conduct of an amphibious operation.

Japanese Sources

The Hattori manuscript and the Japanese monographs previously cited are as useful as background information for Tinian as they are for Saipan and Guam. Many of the documents captured on Saipan furnish considerable information on the troops, weapons, and defensive dispositions on the smaller island. The 4th Marine Division published a file of representive translations of material gathered on Tinian that is an excellent source of information on Japanese operations. JICPOA and CinCPAC-CinCPOA publications of similar material keyed to the island on which it was recovered add another useful source to the body of intelligence available.

Books

Almost all the published sources listed under the Saipan section also concern themselves with Tinian. Admiral Morison's unofficial Navy history is helpful for its account of the naval aspects of the campaign, and Isely and Crowl have a good discussion of amphibious warfare developments. Among the few additional sources consulted were:

Lt John C. Chapin. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, Aug45. A pamphlet history, this small book highlights the actions of the division which made the assault landing on Tinian.

Major Carl W. Hoffman. The Seizure of Tinian. Washington: Historical Division, 1951. This official monograph drew unsolicited praise from several of officers who commented on the more generalized version of the campaign in this volume. The book provides excellent coverage of the planning phase and small unit detail, sparked by participants' comments, of the fighting ashore.

PART VI

VICTORY AT GUAM

Official Records

Although the Guam operation was a cohesive part of FORAGER, it is not particularly

well represented in the reports of the Joint Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Troops. These records of higher headquarters concern themselves largely with the campaign in the northern islands. As a result, the prime sources for a higher headquarters view of the campaign are the reports of Task Force 53 and the III Amphibious Corps. Both of these are useful but not as detailed as similar accounts by attack force and landing force headquarters at Saipan and Tinian. The 3d Marine Division action report includes concise reports of subordinate units as appendices, but the 1st Brigade report is largely a narrative at brigade level with a journal and file of orders issued attached. Only scattered examples of the war diaries and other records originated by the smaller Marine units on Guam have survived, and the reconstruction of narrative of action draws from dissimilar sources for like units, as the footnotes indicate. On the whole, however, there is enough material available to reconstruct an accurate account.

Unofficial Documents

The circulation of the draft manuscript of the monograph on Guam by Major Lodge, who made a special effort to elicit comment from officers of supporting arms and services, drew a number of detailed replies. Gaps in the small unit reports were readily filled by the information supplied by reviewers. From their comments, it was obvious that many of these men had retained copies of records that they had once originated or prepared. A file of comments concerning the Stockman-Carleton booklet on the Marianas campaign was used freely in the preparation of both the monograph and this section. Perhaps the most useful letters among the many that were received were those from the former commanding officer of the 9th Marines, General Craig, who provided detailed and extensive reviews on several occasions. The comments received on the draft manuscript of this section from senior commanders and staff officers are filed with those occasioned by earlier accounts.

Japanese Sources

The translations and interrogations of higher intelligence agencies and of the major commands on Guam were primary sources of Japanese information, but the body of information of this type was not as large as it was on Saipan and Tinian. In order to supplement this information. Lieutenant Colonel Takeda. the senior surviving member of the Guam garrison, was queried by the Historical Branch regarding many puzzling gaps in the story of the Japanese defense. His reply to these questions, together with an earlier and briefer account of the activities of the 29th Division which he prepared after his surrender, were used frequently in the preparation of the monograph and this section. Another useful document, filed like the Takeda letters in the Historical Branch Archives, was an extensive history of the campaign prepared by officers of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force and published in their staff school journal in a series of three articles. A translation of the text of this history written in 1962, was made available to the Historical Branch and it has been used throughout the preparation of this section.

Books and Periodicals

All the overall secondary sources relating to the Marianas campaign and to the assessment of the operations in the Central Pacific were consulted again in writing this account of Guam. In addition, the following were the most useful publications directly related to the operation.

Lt Robert A. Aurthur and Lt Kenneth Cohlmia. *The Third Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. More compact in format than most division histories, this book is a good source for unit background.

LtCol F. Clay Bridgewater, USA. "Reconnaissance on Guam," *The Cavalry Journal*, v. LIV, no. 3 (May-Jun45). The commanding officer of the 77th Division Reconnaissance Troop tells the story of its training and action.

MajGen Andrew D. Bruce, USA. "Administration, Supply, and Evacuation of the 77th Infantry Division on Guam," *Military Review*, v. 24, no. 10 (Dec44). The division commander reviews the combat support activities of his unit on Guam with useful comments on the reasons for various command decisions.

Bevan G. Cass, ed. *History of the Sixth Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. As the predecessor of the division, the 1st Brigade action is covered in some detail in this volume, but the majority of the book is devoted to the Okinawa campaign.

Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh. Hold High the Torch, A History of the 4th Marines. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1960. An official account of the history of one of the regiments of the 1st Brigade with some detail of its actions on Guam.

1stLt Anthony A. Frances. "The Battle for Banzai Ridge," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 6 (Jun45). A vivid story of the 21st Marines in the fighting for the ridges in the 3d Division beachhead.

Historical Division, War Department. Guam, Operations of the 77th Division (21 July-10 August 1944). Washington, 1946. A monograph covering the Army division action in considerable detail written by the division historian.

Capt Lucius W. Johnson, MC, USN. "Guam —Before December 1941," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (Mar46). These recollections by a member of the prewar Navy garrison provide an interesting picture of island life from the American viewpoint.

1stLt Millard Kaufman. "Attack on Guam," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 4 (Apr45). This article is a generalized account of the battle by a former member of the 1st Brigade.

Capt Edwin H. Klein. "The Handling of Supplies on Guam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 2 (Feb45). A review of supply operations on the island, the article concerns itself with shore party and field depot operations. Maj Orlan R. Lodge. The Recapture of Guam. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. This official monograph devotes a chapter to supporting arms and services and is particularly useful for the development of the Japanese side of the campaign.

LtCol Max Myers, USA, ed. Ours to Hold it High: The History of the 77th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. The story of the Statue of Liberty Division provides a good overall view of the fighting on Guam and helpful information on its training and personnel.

Cdr H. E. Smith, CEC, USN. "I Saw the Morning Break," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (Mar46). An eyewitness account of the Guam landing, this article contains vivid descriptive passages.

Laura Thompson. Guam and its People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. This book is primarily a sociological history of Guam with emphasis on the prewar years.

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Guide to Abbreviations

AA	Antiaircraft
AAF	Army Air Forces
AAR	After Action Report
	American-British-Canadian
	Assistant Chief of Staff
ADC	Assistant Division Comman-
	der
Admin	Administrative
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFFE	Army Forces in the Far East
AFPOA	Army Forces, Pacific Ocean
	Areas
AGC	Amphibious Command Ship
	Cargo ship, attack
Altn	
Amtrac	Amphibious Tractor
Anx	
	Transport, attack
APD	Transport, high speed
App	
AR	
Ar	Army
Arty	•
Atk	
	Army of the United States
B –24	Army four-engine bomber,
	the Consolidated Liberator
B-25	Army two-engine bomber, the
D 00	North American Mitchell
B-29	Army four-engine bomber,
.	the Boeing Super-Fortress
Bat	
	Brigadier General
Bn	
Bomb	
Br	
Brig	0
Btry	
Bu	
Bul	
	Commander (units)
U-I	Corps Personnel Office(r)

	Corps Intelligence Office(r)
С–3	Corps Operations and Train- ing Office(r)
C-4	
C-47	
0-41	
a .	the Douglas Skytrain
Capt	Captain
Cbt	Combat
CCS	official official of brain
Cdr	
CEC	- S F
Cen	Central
CG	
Chap	Chapter
CinC	Commander in Chief
СМС	Commandant of the Marine
	Corps
Cmt	Comment
CN0	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
Co	Company
CofS	Chief of Staff
Col	
Com	Command
Comd	•
CominCh	Commander in Chief
Con	Conversation
CP	Command Post
CT	Combat Team
Cor	Corps
COI	Escort carrier
D-1	Division Personnel Office(r)
	• • •
D-2	Division Intelligence Office(r)
D–3	Division Operations and Training Office(r)
D-4	Division Logistics Office(r)
DA	Department of the Army
DE	Destroyer Escort
Def	Defense
Dep	Depot
Dept	=
Disp	1
Div	Division

DMS	Destroyer Minesweeper	Intel	Intelligence
Ed			Joint Assault Signal Com-
	Amphibious truck		pany
Ech		JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ed			Joint Intelligence Center, Pa-
Est		<i>U</i>	cific Ocean Areas
Evac		Jnl	
Expc		Jnt	
	Navy-Marine single engine		Joint Planning Staff
140	fighter, the Chance-Vought		Killed in Action
	Corsair		Lieutenant Commander
FAdm			Landing Craft, Control
	Final Beachhead Line		Landing Craft, Infantry
FE			Landing Craft, Infantry
Fld		LOI(G)	(Gunboat)
Flt		LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
	Fleet Marine Force		Landing Craft, Tank
FO			Landing Craft, Vehicle and
For		LOVI	Personnel
	Federal Record Center	Ldg	
Fite			Logistics; Logistical
Fwd			Landing Ship, Dock
G-1	Division (or larger unit)		Landing Ship, Dock Landing Ship, Tank
G-1	Personnel Office(r)		Landing Team
C 9	Division (or larger unit)	Lt	
u-4	Intelligence Office(r)	Ltr	
C 3	Division (or larger unit)		Letter Landing Vehicle, Tracked
u-0	Operations and Training		
	Office(r)	LVI(A)	Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored)
G-4	Division (or larger unit)	M4	
u 1	Logistics Office (r)	M4 M5	
Gar		Maj	
Gen			Marine Aircraft Group
	General Headquarters	Mar	
GO			Marine Aircraft Wing
	Government Printing Office		Marine Air Warning Group
Gnd			Marine Bomber Group
Gru			Marine Base Defense Air-
	History; Historical	MDDAW	craft Wing
Hq		ΜΙΔ	Missing in Action
	Headquarters, United States	Mil	
114m0	Marine Corps		Military Intelligence Service
H&S	Headquarters and Service	Mm	Millimeter
	III Amphibious Corps		Marine Night Fighter Group
	Imperial Japanese Army	MS	
	Imperial Japanese Navy	Msg	
	I Marine Amphibious Corps	Mtg	
Inf		Nav	
Incl	-		Noncommissioned Officer
Info			Navy Department
Instl		NGF	
Instn			Naval History Division
			-

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

No	Number
NTLF.	Northern Troops and Land-
0	ing Force Order; Officer
OAB	
0/B	
Occ	
OCMH	
	History
Off	Office
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
Op	
OPD	
OPlan	Operation Plan
Org	Organization
OY	
	observation plane, the Con-
D /7	solidated-Vultee Sentinel
P-47	,
Pac	the Republic Thunderbolt Pacific; Pacific Fleet
PB4Y	
1 D41	bomber, the Consolidated
	Liberator
Pers	
Phib	Amphibious
POA	
POW	Prisoner of War
P(p)	Page(s)
Prelim	
Pt	-
Pub	
R4D	
	 transport, the Douglas Skytrain
RAdm	Rear Admiral
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
Rec	
	Recommendation
Recon	
Regt	
Rel	Relations
Rep	
	Revised
RJ	
Rpt	Report
5–3	Battalion or Regimental Op-
	erations and Training Of- fice(r)
Salv	
	Special Action Report
SC	Submarine Chaser
014 001 0 67	


SCR	Signal Corps Radio
Sct	Scout
Sec	Section
Sec	Serial
Serv	
Ship	Shipping
Sho	Shore
Sig	Signal
Sit	Situation
Sked	Schedule
SMS	Supply and Maintenance
	Squadron
SNLF	Special Naval Landing Force
SP	Shore Party
Spl	Special
Spt	Support
Sqn	Squadron
Sta	Status
Sta	Staff
STLF	
SILF	Southern Troops and Land-
	ing Force
Strat	Strategic
Subj	Subject
Subor	Subordinate
Sum	Summary
Sup	Supply
Suppl	Supplement
TBS	Talk Between Ships radio
TBX	Semi-portable low-power field
IDA	
	radio
TBY	Portable low-power field ra-
	dio
Tel	Telephone
Tg	Telegraph
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
Tk	Tank
TM	
m 0	Technical Manual
	- F
T/O	
TQM	
Tr	Transport Quartermaster Translated; Translator
-	
Tr	Translated; Translator Tractor
Tr Trac Trans	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport
Tr Trac Trans Trng	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U UDT	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit Underwater Demolition Team
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U UDT USA	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit Underwater Demolition Team United States Army
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U UDT USAF	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit Underwater Demolition Team United States Army United States Air Force
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U UDT USAF	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit Underwater Demolition Team United States Army United States Air Force United States Army Forces,
Tr Trac Trans Trng Trp U UDT USAF	Translated; Translator Tractor Transport Training Troop Unit Underwater Demolition Team United States Army United States Air Force

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USAFPOA United States Army Forces,	Vic Vicinity
Pacific Ocean Areas	VMF Marine fighter squadron
USMC United States Marine Corps	VMF(N) Marine night fighter squad-
USN United States Navy	ron
USS United States Ship	VMO Marine observation squadron
USSBS United States Strategic	WarD War Diary
Bombing Survey	WD War Department
V Volume	-
VAC V Amphibious Corps	WIA Wounded in Action
VB Navy dive bomber squadron	WO Warrant Officer
Veh Vehicle	Wpn Weapons
VHF Very High Frequency	WW World War

Military Map Symbols



T.L. RUSSELL

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited to those coming within the scope of this book, and those forecasting events to be treated in the volumes to follow. 1941

1941		
	Japanese occupy Tarawa and Makin Islands in Gilberts.	9Feb _
10Dec	Guam surrenders to Japa-	
23Dec	nese landing force. Wake Island surrenders to Japanese.	21Feb
1942		
1Feb	U. S. carrier task forces raid Japanese positions in Gil- berts and Marshalls.	2–5 Ma i
30Mar	Pacific Ocean divided into Pa- cific Ocean Areas under	
	Adm Nimitz, and South- west Pacific Area under Gen MacArthur.	15Mar
4-8May	Battle of the Coral Sea.	
4–6Jun	Japanese are decisively de- feated in main Battle of Midway.	26Apr
7Aug	1st MarDiv lands on Guadal- canal and Tulagi to launch first U. S. offensive of the war.	
17Aug	2d RdrBn lands from subma- rines at Makin Island. Raid is completed following day.	12–25 N
20Aug	First Marine aircraft arrive on Henderson Field, Guad- alcanal.	12-2014
	5th DefBn occupies Funafuti, Ellice Islands.	
1943		
14–23Jan	Casablanca Conference to de- termine strategy for 1943. Agreement reached to ad-	21Jun
	vance toward Philippines through Central and South- west Pacific, and to ter-	14–24A

	minate hostilities only upon
	"unconditional surrender"
	of the enemy.
8Feb J	apanese complete evacuation
	of over 11,000 troops from
	Guadalcanal.
9Feb C	rganized resistance on Guad-
	alcanal ceases.
21Feb A	rmy troops, reinforced by
	Marine raiders and anti-
	aircraft units, seize Russell
0 ×37	Islands without opposition.
2–5Mar I	Battle of Bismarck Sea. U.S.
	and Australian aircraft bomb Japanese destroyers
	and troop transports en
	route to Lae, New Guinea.
15Mar (Central Pacific Force redes-
	ignated Fifth Fleet; South
	Pacific Force becomes
	Third Fleet.
26Apr 0	eneral MacArthur issues
	ELKTON III, superseding
•	previous ELKTON plans.
	Plan calls for mutually
	supporting advances in
	South Pacific and South-
	west Pacific Area toward Rabaul, Operation CART-
	WHEEL.
12-25 May 7	RIDENT Conference held
10-20 Hay 1	in Washington. General
	approval given to "U. S.
	Strategic Plan for the De-
	feat of Japan" calling for
	drive on Japan through
	Central Pacific.
21Jun H	Elements of 4th RdrBn open
	Central Solomons campaign
	with landing at Segi Point,
14.044	New Georgia.
14–24Aug @	UADRANT Conference in
	Quebec. CCS decide to at-

602

011100100000		
4Sep	tack Japan along both Cen- tral and Southwest Pacific routes. VAC formed under command of MajGen Holland M. Smith to train and control troops for amphibious land- ings in Central Pacific.	2
15Sep	2d MarDiv is formally as- signed to VAC.	2
r	TF 15 and Seventh Air Force launch coordinated attacks against Tarawa.	2
20Sep	4th MarDiv assigned to VAC.	
	VAdm Raymond A. Spruance	2
240cp	recommends an amphibious operation against Makin.	2
50et	CinCPac-CinCPOA issues plan for offensive in Cen-	ę
	tral Pacific. D-Day for landings in Gilberts set for 19Nov43, later postponed	
	to 20Nov.	1
130ct	Photographic coverage of Makin Atoll obtained.	
200ct	Photographic coverage of Tarawa obtained.	
050		
250et	VAdm Spruance issues oper- ation plan for GALVANIC,	
	Gilberts Operation.	2
31Oct-7Nov	Northern Attack Force (TF 52) rehearses for GAL-	
	VÁNIC off Hawaii. South-	2
	ern Attack Force (TF 53) rehearses at Efate, New	
	Hebrides.	
1Nov	IMAC lands on Bougainville with 3d and 9th Marines and 2d RdrRegt in assault.	2
10N		
10NOV	Main body of Northern At- tack Force for GALVANIC leaves Pearl Harbor.	3
12Nov	Southern Attack Force com-	
121(0)	pletes rehearsal and de- parts from New Hebrides.	
19Nov	Final air bombardment of	1
	Gilberts, Marshalls, and Nauru in preparation for	
	Gilberts invasion.	2
20Nov	VAC assault troops, 2d Mar- Div at Tarawa and ele- ments of 27th InfDiv at	2

Makin, make landings in the Gilberts. Tarawa landings successful despite heavy casualties.

- 21Nov _____ Marines on Tarawa strengthen their hold on island. VAC ReconCo lands on Apamama Atoll.
- 22Nov _____ MajGen Julian Smith establishes CP on Tarawa.
- 22Nov-7Dec __ SEXTANT Conference held at Cairo. Tentative timetable for offensive against Japan established.
- 23Nov _____ End of organized resistance on Tarawa and Makin.
- 3Jan _____ Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51 under RAdm Turner) issues operation plan for FLINTLOCK, assault on Marshalls.
- 13Jan _____ CinCPac-CinCPOA Campaign Plan GRANITE outlines tentative operations and timetable for Central Pacific offensive. Main body of TF 53 departs San Diego.
- 22Jan _____ Main body of FLINTLOCK attack force sail from Hawaii for Marshalls.
- 23Jan _____ Attack force reserve for FLINTLOCK and Majuro Attack Group sail for target.
- 29-30Jan _____ Carrier planes and naval vessels join in final neutralization of Marshalls.
- 31Jan _____ VAC assault troops seize small islands of Kwajalein Atoll as artillery positions for main landing support. VAC ReconCo secures Majuro Atoll.
- 1Feb _____ 4th MarDiv lands at Roi-Namur and 7th InfDiv at Kwajalein Island.
- 2Feb _____ 7th InfDiv troops meet increased resistance. 4th Mar-Div completes mopup of Roi and capture of Namur.

	MajGen Harry Schmidt announces end of organ- ized resistance on Namur.	29–30 M a
4Feb	7th InfDiv completes cap- ture of Kwajalein Island. RAdm Harry W. Hill given command of Task Group 51.11 with the mission of seizing Eniwetok Atoll.	11Jun -
7Feb	4th MarDiv concludes un- eventful search of islands of northern Kwajalein	13Jun -
15Feb	Atoll. Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG 51.11 under RAdm Hill) leaves Kwaja-	14Jun _
17Feb	lein for Eniwetok. Tactical Group 1, VAC, be- gins landing in Eniwetok Atoll (Operation CATCH-	15Jun _
18Feb	POLE). 22d Marines (reinforced) se-	16Jun _
19Feb	cure Engebi. Elements of 27th InfDiv and 22d Marines land on Eni- wetok Island.	
21Feb	Capture of Eniwetok Island completed.	
22Feb	22d Marines assault and se- cure Parry.	
12Mar	JCS direct seizure of South- ern Marianas, target date 15Jun44.	18Jun _
20Mar	4th Marines seize Emirau in the Bismarcks. Adm Nim- itz issues FORAGER Joint Staff Study setting forth the purpose of the Mari- anas operation.	19Jun _
26Apr	Expeditionary Troops opera- tion order states mission " to capture, occupy, and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam"	19–20J u
17-19May	Northern Troops and Land- ing Force maneuvers and	
	rehearses at Maui and Ka- hoolawe, Hawaiian Islands.	22Jun
25 M ay	LSTs carrying assault ele- ments of the 2d and 4th	24Jun _
	MarDivs depart Pearl Har- bo r.	30Jun _

- 29-30May ____ Portion of the Northern Troops and Landing Force not embarked in LSTs departs Pearl Harbor.
 - 1Jun _____ Carrier planes of TF 58 begin preinvasion softening of Marianas. Northern Attack Force departs Eniwetok for Saipan.
- 13Jun _____ TF 58 continues aerial bombardment of Marianas and begins naval bombardment.
- 14Jun _____ VAC assault troops approach Saipan. Underwater demolition and minesweeping operations conducted along coast.
- 15Jun _____ 2d and 4th MarDivs land on Saipan.
 - n _____ VAdm Spruance postpones landing on Guam because major naval battle appears imminent. Naval surface forces begin preinvasion bombardment of Guam. Elements of 27th InfDiv land on Saipan during night 16-17Jun44. Japanese launch strong, unsuccessful, tankinfantry night attack against 6th Marines.
- 18Jun _____ 4th MarDiv drives to east coast of Saipan, cutting island in two. 27th InfDiv captures Aslito airfield.
- 9Jun _____ 4th MarDiv begins clearing northern part of Saipan. 27th InfDiv troops to clear Nafutan Point and south coast of Saipan.
- 19–20Jun _____ Battle of the Philippine Sea. Carrier aircraft of TF 58 engage planes from enemy carriers and inflict crippling losses.
- 22Jun _____ VAC attacks northward on Saipan.
- 24Jun _____ 2d Marines reach outskirts of Garapan.
- 30Jun _____ Commanders' conference on Saipan decides landings on

tle for central Saipan.	
2Jul 2d Marines seize Garapan.	
Japanese fall back to final	
defense line in northern	1 A
Saipan.	
8Jul Southern Attack Force be-	104
	101
gins naval bombardment of	
Guam.	
9Jul Saipan declared secure. Jap-	
anese garrison of about	15
22,000 is virtually de-	
stroyed.	
12Jul FMFPac activated with Lt-	
Gen Holland M. Smith as	150
	15
commander.	
14Jul Joint Staff Study for Opera-	
tion STALEMATE (inva-	
sion of the Palaus) issued.	
20Jul Volume of aerial attacks	
against Guam reaches	
peak. Naval bombardment	
=	17
continues. Preinvasion air	
and naval bombardment of	30
Tinian also in progress.	
21Jul IIIAC assault troops land on	
Guam. 3d MarDiv and 1st	90
ProvMarBrig push inland	
and by nightfall hold two	14
	14
beachheads. Elements of	
77th InfDiv also go ashore.	
22Jul Softening up of Tinian con-	20
tinues. Marines repel coun-	
terattacks on Guam and	24-
continue advance inland.	
24Jul 4th MarDiv lands on Tinian	251
and secures beachhead.	40.
25Jul 4th MarDiv expands beach-	
head on Tinian. Japanese	
unsuccessfully counterat-	
tack IIIAC positions on	9J
Guam.	13
26Jul 2d MarDiv lands on Tinian.	
1st ProvMarBrig opens at-	
tack to clear Orote Penin-	10
	19
sula on Guam.	
28Jul Marines on Tinian continue	26
rapid advance against light	
resistance from retreating	1 A
enemy.	
30Jul Marines capture Tinian town	 •
	7 <i>A</i>
and compress Japanese in-	

21Jul44. Conclusion of bat-

to southern tip of island. MajGen Geiger issues or-

ders for pursuit of enemy northward on Guam.

- 1Aug _____ Organized enemy resistance ends on Tinian.
- 10Aug _____ End of organized Japanese resistance on Guam, though hundreds of Japanese remain to be mopped up.
- 15Aug _____ IIIAC, having completed its operations in the Marianas, is committed to invasion of the Palaus.
- 15Sep _____ JCS decide to invade Central rather than Southern Philippines and advance target date for invasion of Leyte from 20Dec to 20Oct44. 1st MarDiv lands on southwest shore of Peleliu Island.
- 17Sep _____ 81st InfDiv, as part of IIIAC, lands on Angaur.
- 30Sep _____ Peleliu, Angaur, Ngesebus, and Kongauru declared occupied.
- 9Oct _____ Third Fleet bombards Marcus Island.
- 14Oct _____ VAC directed to prepare plans for Iwo Jima operation.
- 20Oct _____ U. S. Army troops invade Leyte.
- 24-26Oct _____ Battle of Leyte Gulf which ends in U. S. naval victory.
- 25Nov _____ CinCPOA issues operation plan for invasion of Iwo Jima. Tentative date 3Feb 45.
- 9Jan _____ Sixth Army invades Luzon.

1945

- 13Feb _____ Final rehearsals for Iwo Jima operation concluded off coast of Tinian.
- 19Feb _____ Assault troops of VAC land on Iwo Jima.
- 26Mar _____ End of Japanese resistance on Iwo Jima.
- 1Apr _____ Tenth Army, including III-AC, lands on Okinawa.
- 7Apr _____ Battle of East China Sea. Japanese fleet units head-

ing toward Okinawa are	6Aug
intercepted by planes of TF 58 .	9Aug
25May JCS direct invasion of Japan,	8
scheduled for 1Nov45.	
14Jun JCS order commanders in	12Aug
Pacific to prepare plans	
for immediate occupation of Japan.	15Aug
22Jun End of organized resistance on Okinawa.	30Aug
16Jul Atomic bomb successfully	
tested at Los Alamos, New Mexico.	2Sep

6Aug Tini	an-based B–29 drops
at	omic bomb on Hiroshima.
9Aug Tini	an-based B-29 drops
at	omic bomb on Nagasaki.
Rı	issia invades Manchuria.
12Aug Sovi	et troops move into Ko-
re	a.
15Aug Offe	nsive action against Ja-
pa	n halted.
30Aug 4th	Marines go ashore at
Ye	okosuka. Army troops
la	nd at Atsugi airfield.
2Son Ione	noso sign instrument of

ep _____ Japanese sign instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay.

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Fleet Marine Force Status-31 October 1943¹

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Unit and location	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Outside U.S.A.				
Central Pacific Area				
Oahu				
Headquarters & Service Battalion, VAC	78	435	10	20
Signal Battalion, VAC	66	· 670	26	7
Reconnaissance Company, VAC	6	93	1	
Transient Center, VAC	3	18		
Rear Echelon, Transient Center, VAC*	31	289	14	73
Corps Motor Transport Company, VAC*	5	105		
Headquarters & Service Company, Marine Forces, 14th Naval				
District	31	289	2	4
6th Base Depot	23	324		2
1st Defense Battalion	63	1,460	3	27
15th Defense Battalion	61	1,284	4	21
4th Marine Division*	1,002	17,132	129	1,588
4th Radio Intelligence Platoon*	1	29		
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion*	36	855	1	9
1st Amphibian Tractor Detachment*	1	20		
1st Joint Assault Signal Company*	25	347		
1st Ammunition Company*	9	272		
12th Marine Depot Company*	4	173		
25th Replacement Battalion*	39	1,141	7	76
30th Replacement Battalion*	51	1,205	8	125
33d Replacement Battalion*	169	2,412	8	104
Headquarters Squadron, MAW, Pac	20	64	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-114	44	189	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron-225	56	245	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-245	48	280		
Marine Utility Squadron-252	32	336		
Headquarters Squadron-23, MAG-23	63	692	10	16
Service Squadron-23, MAG-23	15	249		
Marine Fighter Squadron-113,MAG-23	47	242	1	8
Area Sub-Total	2,029	30,850	227	2,096
			———	

See footnote at end of table.

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		Streng	th	
Unit and location	USI	MC	US	N
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Midway				
641 Defense Bettelien	49	1 095	5	32
6th Defense Battalion Headquarters Squadron-22, MAG-22	10	1,925 133	3	1
Service Squadron-22, MAG-22	6	133	ð	1.
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-231, MAG-22	58	133 280	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-422, MAG-22	47	238	1	
Marine Fighter Squaron 122, Millo 22				
Area Sub-Total	170	2,715	10	6
Johnston				
16th Defense Battalion	49	913	4	19
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-133	33	184	1	4
- Area Sub-Total	82	1.097		23
Palmyra				
Scout Bombing Detachment-1	14	100	1	4
Samoan Area				
Samoa				
Headquarters Squadron-31, MAG-31	26	400	9	16
Service Squadron-31, MAG-31	10	247		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-341, MAG-31	45	278		
Area Sub-Total		925	9	
Tutuila				
1 000000				
Headquarters, Defense Force, Samoa	31	172	6	
Signal Company, Defense Force, Samoa	10	165		
Harbor Defense Group	23	277	2	28
Base Depot, FMF	43	763	10	19
5th Separate Medical Company		24	5	98
7th & 8th Marine Depot Companies	6	220		
2d Defense Battalion	57	957	5	29
22d Marines (Reinforced)	175	3,229	20	43
8th Garrison Replacement Detachment*	8	250	2	5
9th Garrison Replacement Detachment*	8	250	2	50
Headquarters Squadron-4, 4th MBDAW	39	248	8	
Marine Utility Squadron-353, 4th MBDAW	28	283	1	20
Headquarters Squadron-13, MAG-13	44	415	7]	2

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS-30 OCTOBER 1943

		Stren	gth	
Unit and location	USN	AC	USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Service Squadron-13, MAG-13	13	250		
Marine Fighter Squadron-224, MAG-13	45	242	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-241, MAG-13	32	276	1	Ì
Headquarters Squadron-14, MAG-14	39	472	5	1
Area Sub-Total	601	8,493	75	775
Upolu-Savaii				
3d Marine Brigade	76	1,098	15	12
Wallis Headquarters Company, 8th Defense Battalion (Reinforced) 8th Defense Battalion	5 75	50 1,100		
3d Separate Medical Company	10	1,100	5	34 70
Marine Fighter Squadron-311, MAG-31	45	235	U U	~ ~ ~
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-331, MAG-31	46	280 280		
Area Sub-Total	171	1,678	11	11
Funafuti				
5th Defense Battalion	54	1,284	47	636
Marine Fighter Squadron-111, MAG-13	45	234	1	(
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-151, MAG-13		285	1	
Area Sub-Total	143	1,803	49	65(
Nanomea				
7th Defense Battalion	49	1,104	9	26
Marine Fighter Squadron-441, MAG-13	33	235	1	20
Area Sub-Total	82	1,339	10	34
Nukufetau 2d Airdrome Battalion (17th Defense Battalion)	35	885	5	63
South Pacific Area				
Enroute or Ordered to the Area				
Marine Fighter Squadron–216* Marine Fighter Squadron–223*	47 38	242 237	1	8 7

See footnote at end of table.

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		Stren	gth	
Unit and location	US	MC	US	N
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-243*	40	282	1	
Marine Photographic Squadron-254*	40	399	1	į
Marine Fighter Squadron-321*	44	232		8
Area Sub-Total	209	1,392	4	4(
Guadal canal				
Headquarters & Service Battalion, IMAC	153	875	15	23
1st Corps Motor Transport Battalion	26	615	1	(
1st Corps Medical Battalion	1	124	40	356
1st Corps Naval Construction Battalion			27	806
1st Corps Signal Battalion	53	714	5	22
1st Corps Tank Battalion (Medium)	35	696	1	13
3d Marine Division	953	17,002	140	1,664
1st 155mm Artillery Battalion	36	554	1	10
2d 155mm Artillery Battalion	28	511	1	9
Ist Parachute Regiment	105	2,079	17	78 74
2d Marine Raider Regiment	88	1,923	12	19
3d Defense Battalion	53	1,241 384	4	8
Marine Air Base Squadron-1, 1st MAW	13 13	384 144	1	5
Service Squadron-14, MAG-14	10	244	1	8
Repair & Salvage Squadron–1, MAG–14				
Area Sub-Total	1,567	27,106	266	3,104
New Caledonia				
Headquarters Company, Supply Service, IMAC	60	247	1	3
Fransient Center, IMAC	99	1,527	34	228 20
4th Defense Battalion	60	809	5	20 23
st Base Depot	81 77	1,728	1 19	23 59
st Marine Raider Regiment		1,732 469	19	
Barrage Balloon Group, IMAC	28 9	409	5	0
Marine Beach Jumper Unit No. 1	3	135		
th, 5th, & 6th Separate Wire Platoons*	8	318		
th & 10th Marine Depot Companies*	8 4	173	-	
1th Marine Depot Company* 29th Replacement Battalion*	55	1.387	8	118
Bist Replacement Battalion*	50	1,245	7	75
22 Replacement Battalion*	36	773	· · · · ·	
7th Replacement Battalion*	1	7		
	- 1			
Marine Air Depot Squadron-1, 1st MAW	21	291	5	10

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FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS—30 OCTOBER 1943

		Stren	· — — —	
Unit and location	US	MC	US	SN
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Service Squadron-25, MAG-25	20	402		
Marine Utility Squadron-152, MAG-25	44	212		
Marine Utility Squadron-153, MAG-25	47	209		
Marine Utility Squadron-253, MAG-25	44	198		
Area Sub-Total	797	12,346	117	64
= Espiritu Santo				
Headquarters Squadron-1, 1st MAW	128	916	9	2
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-134, 1st MAW*	49	296	1	
Marine Photographic Squadron-154, 1st MAW	32	393	3	
Headquarters Squadron-11, MAG-11	59	580	9	1
Service Squadron-11, MAG-11	22	374		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-143, MAG-11	33	329	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-213, MAG-11	31	342	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-214, MAG-11	61	243	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-222, MAG-14	33	234	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-233, MAG-21	44	308	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-236, MAG-21		289	1	
Area Sub-Total	536	4,304	28	10
Russells				
10th Defense Battalion	60	1,130	4	2
th Base Depot	53	1,200	9	1
Marine Fighter Squadron-211, MAG-11	34	235	1	
Headquarters Squadron-21, MAG-21	19	361	7	
Service Squadron-21, MAG-21	10	218		
Marine Night Fighter Squadron–531 (Forward Echelon), MAG–21	17	179	1	
	193	3,323	22	 5
= Efate				
Marine Fighter Squadron-123, MAG-21	33	258	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-234, MAG-21	41	291	1	
Headquarters Squadron-24, MAG-24	20	252	6	
Service Squadron-24, MAG-24	10	216		
-	65	348	10]
Headquarters Squadron–2, 2d MAW	00 1	010		

See footnote at end of table.

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		Streng	th	
Unit and location	USI	MC	US	N
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Service Squadron-12, MAG-12	. 10	233		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-144, MAG-21		295	1	
Area Sub-Total	. 228	2,198	25	6
New Zealand				
2d Marine Division	978	18,821	150	1,74
1st Aviation Engineer Battalion		347	6	19
2d Antitank Battalion	. 26	372	1	1
2d Base Depot	. 28	500	1	14
3d Base Depot	35	347	6	
Area Sub-Total	1,101	20,387	164	1,80
Southwest Pacific Area				
Goodenough				
1st Marine Division		17,468	135	1,56
27th Replacement Battalion*	60	1,360	8	12
Area Sub-Total	. 1,016	18,828	143	1,68
New Georgia				
9th Defense Battalion	1 1	1,210	3	2
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-232, MAG-11		326	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-244, MAG-11		260	1	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-144, MAG-24	43		1	
Area Sub-Total	. 184	2,075	6	
Rendova 11th Defense Battalion		1 001		0
	61	1,061	4	
Vella Lavella				
4th Defense Battalion	. 59	1,148	4	22
4th Base Depot, Branch No. 3	45	591	4	1
Marine Fighter Squadron-212, MAG-11	. 34	234	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron-215, MAG-14	. 30	242	1	٤
Marine Fighter Squadron-221, MAG-24	33	251	1	
Area Sub-Total	201	2,466	11	61

.		Streng		
Unit and location	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off 	Enl
Woodlark				
12th Defense Battalion	44	1,064	4	25
Carribean Area				
Guantanamo Bay				
13th Defense Battalion	49	683	3	1
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands				
Marine Scouting Squadron-3	34	106		
West Coast, U.S.A.				
San Diego				
Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast	41	229		
Supply Squadron–5 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron–132*	19 4	$\begin{array}{c} 202 \\ 275 \end{array}$	1	
Area Sub-Total	64	706	1	
El Centro				
Headquarters Squadron-43, MBDAG-43		922	4	1
Service Squadron-43, MBDAG-43 Marine Fighter Squadron-122, MBDAG-43	10	215		
Marine Observation Squadron-122, MBDAG-45	48	172 279	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-217, MBDAG-43	49	219	1	
Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron-243, MBDAG-43	49	316	1	
Area Sub-Total	275	2,155	6	2
El Toro				
Headquarters Squadron-41, MBDAG-41	23	1,505		
Service Squadron-41, MBDAG-41	13	254		
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron-131, MBDAG-41	62	306	2	
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron–141, MBDAG–41 Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron–142, MBDAG–41	53 8	$\begin{array}{c} 258\\ 48\end{array}$	2	1:
Area Sub-Total	159	2,371	4	

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		Stren	gth	
Unit and location	US	SMC	U	SN
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Camp Elliott				
Headquarters Company, FMF, San Diego Area	75	330	6	
Headquarters Battalion, Training Center	50	657	30	28
Infantry Battalion, Training Center	307	3 ,420		
School Battalion, Training Center	54	609		
Tank Battalion, Training Center	74	724		
Field Medical School Battalion, Training Center	5	25	51	77
Base Depot, FMF	30	459	2	13
Women's Reserve Battalion, FMF, San Diego Area	25	454		
Area Sub-Total	620	6,678	89	820
Camp Gillespie				
Parachute Training School	56	689	6	32
Camp Kearney				
Headquarters Squadron-15, MAG-15	276	624	6	26
Service Squadron-15, MAG-15	13	345		
Marine Utility Squadron-952, MAG-15	30	214		
Area Sub-Total	319	1,183	6	26
= Camp Pendleton				
Headquarters Battalion, Training Center	66	383	9	69
Artillery Battalion, Training Center	87	762		
Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Training Center	39	315	3	
Engineer Battalion, Training Center	74	708		
Naval Construction Battalion, Training Center			19	641
Field Signal Battalion, Training Center	17	1,029		
Raider Battalion, Training Center	24	422		1
th Parachute Battalion		637	5	26
Area Sub-Total	334	4,256	36	737
Miramar				
	3	28		
Headquarters & Service Squadron, 2d MAWG	20	102	1	16
leadquarters & Service Squadron, 2d MAWG	20			
Headquarters & Service Squadron, 2d MAWG Headquarters Squadron, Personnel Group Nir Regulating Squadron-1	6 7	906 - 651 -		1 123

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS-30 OCTOBER 1943

		Stren	·	
Unit and location	USI	AC _	US	N
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Air Regulating Squadron-3	270	841	15	
Air Regulating Squadron-4		674		
Area Sub-Total	313	3,202	16	14
Mojave				
Headquarters Squadron-44, MBDAG-44	34	457	3	
Service Squadron-44, MBDAG-44	10	247		
Marine Fighter Squadron-121, MBDAG-44	14	125	1	
Marine Fighter Squadron-124, MBDAG-44	6	35		• - •
Marine Fighter Squadron-218, MBDAG-44	50	268		
Marine Observation Squadron-251, MBDAG-44	50	297		
Area Sub-Total	164	1,429	4	1
East Coast, U.S.A.	=			
Camp Lejeune				
Headquarters Company, Training Center	6	4		
War Dog Training Company, Training Center	7	157		
Amphibian Base Battalion, Training Center		226	86	75
Artillery Battalion, Training Center	162	1,465		
Engineer Battalion, Training Center		1,019		
Infantry Battalion, Training Center	145	622	50	57
Parachute Battalion, Training Center		17		
Quartermaster Battalion, Training Center	72	882		
Range Battalion, Training Center		278		
Signal Battalion, Training Center		3,409		16
Naval Construction Battalion, Training Center			35	1,20
18th Defense Battalion		648	3	2
51st Defense Battalion	71	1,654	6	3
7th Separate Infantry Battalion		37	1	1
7th Separate Pack Howitzer Battery	5	62		
2d Battalion, 13th Marines	15	65		
Area Sub-Total	896	10,545	181	2,77
Norfolk				
	[]	46 0	1	

See footnote at end of table.

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		Stren	gth	
Unit and location	USI	4C	USI	N
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Cherry Point				
Headquarters Squadron-3, 3d MAW	57	496	20	51
Headquarters Squadron-1, MAWG-1	47	490 313	20	18
Air Warning Squadron-1, MAWG-1	14	178	- 1	10
Air Warning Squadron-2 MAWG-1	14	178		1
Air Warning Squadron-4, MAWG-1	14	60		-
Headquarters Squadron-35, MAG-35	16	237		
Service Squadron-35, MAG-35				
Marine Observation Squadron-351, MAG-35	10 22	203		
Marine Utility Squadron-352, MAG-35		144		
	38	179		
Marine Photographic Squadron-354, MAG-35	34	254	3	
Headquarters Squadron-53, MNFG-53	33	61	-	21
Service Squadron-53, MNFG-53	10	410		
Marine Night Fighter Squadron-531 (Rear Echelon), MNFG-53	16	119		
Marine Night Fighter Squadron-532, MNFG-53	25	253		
Marine Night Fighter Squadron-555, MNFG-53	3	4		
Marine Night Fighter Squadron-534, MNFG-53	2	5		
Headquarters Squadron-61, MBG-61	327	493	3	20
Marine Bomber Squadron-611, MBG-61	1	2		
Marine Bomber Squadron-612, MBG-61	1	2		~
Marine Bomber Squadron-613, MBG-61	1	1		
Marine Bomber Squadron-614, MBG-61	1	1		<u>~</u>
Area Sub-Total	683	3,594	27	122
Oak Grove				
Air Warning Squadron-3, MAWG-1	11	120		e
Headquarters Squadron-32, MAG-32	23	273	5	41
Service Squadron-32, MAG-32	11	204		
Marine Fighter Squadron-314, MAG-32	20	48		
Marine Fighter Squadron-323, MAG-32	41	227		
Marine Fighter Squadron-324, MAG-32	15	44		
Area Sub-Total	121	916	5	47
Parris Island			<u></u>	
Marine Fighter Squadron, MAG-32	44	220	2	2
Marine Fighter Squadron-322, MAG-32	43	220		
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Area Sub-Total	87	425	3	7

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS-30 OCTOBER 1943

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-		Stren	gth	
Unit and location	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
New Bern				
Marine Fighter Squadron-313, MAG-32	32	167		
Bogue				
Headquarters Squadron-33, MAG-33	16	202	6	39
Service Squadron-33, MAG-33	9	156		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-332, MAG-33	43	201		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-333, MAG-33	43	210		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-334, MAG-33	42	202		
Area Sub-Total	153	971	6	39
Atlantic				
Headquarters Squadron-34, MAG-34	13	271	5	39
Service Squadron-34, MAG-34	4	175		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-342, MAG-34	44	221		
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron-343, MAG-34	43	206		
Area Sub-Total	104	873	5	39
Total FMF (Ground) Overseas	5,583	99.789	808	9.095
Total FMF (Air) Overseas		20,833	167	613
Total FMF (Ground) in U.S.A.		45,919	444	6.426
Total FMF (Air) in U.S.A.		20,830	95	531
Total FMF Overseas		120,622	975	9,708
Total FMF in U.S.A.		66,749	539	6,957
	14,454	187,371	1.514	16,665

¹Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for October 1943 held in the Archives of the Historical Branch. G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units en route or ordered to the indicated areas (indicated by an asterisk *) are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary location.

Table of Organization F-100-Marine Division

5 May 1944 ¹

Unit	US	MC	U	USN		Totals	
0	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Eni	
Division Headquarters	(66)	(186)	(4)	(1)	(70)	(187	
Headquarters Battalion	101	883	7	13	108	896	
Headquarters Company	(73)	(394)	(7)	(9)	(80)	(403	
Signal Company	(17)	(275)			(17)	(275	
Military Police Company	(6)	(96)			(6)	1 1	
Reconnaissance Company	(5)	(118)		(4)	(5)	1	
Tank Battalion	35	585	1	9	36	594	
Headquarters & Service Company	(14)	(99)	(1)	(9)	(15)	(108	
3 Tank Companies (each)	(7)	(162)			(7)		
Service Troops	58	1,343	66	422	124	1,765	
Service Battalion	(29)	(702)	(2)	(18)	(31)		
Headquarters Company	(9)	(48)			(11)		
Service & Supply Company	(13)	(483)		(9)	(13)		
Ordnance Company	(7)	(171)			(7)		
Motor Transport Battalion	(28)	(501)	(1)	(9)	(29)		
Headquarters & Service Company	(13)	1		1	(14)		
3 Transport Companies (each)	(5)	1			(5)		
Medical Battalion	(1)	1		(395)	(64)		
Headquarters & Service Company	(1)	1			(29)		
5 Medical Companies (each)		(25)		(/	(20)		
Engineer Battalion	41	842	1	20	42	862	
Headquarters & Service Company	(23)	1	1	(20)	(24)		
3 Engineer Companies (each)	(6)	/	(-)	(20)	(6)		
Pioneer Battalion	38	672	3	32	41	704	
Headquarters & Service Company	(11)	(81)	1 -	(32)	(14)		
3 Pioneer Companies (each)	(9)				(9)	· ·	
Artillery Regiment	159	2,415	8	57	167	2,472	
Headquarters & Service Battery	(23)		-		(27)		
2 105mm Howitzer Battalions (each)	(33)	((12)	(34)	1	
Headquarters & Service Battery	(15)	(/		(12)	(16)		
3 Howitzer Batteries (each)	(6)	1	(1)	()	(10)	(141)	
2 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions (each)	(35)	1	(1)	(12)	(36)	(567	
Headquarters & Service Battery	(14)	(132)		(12)	(15)	(144	
3 Pack Howitzer Batteries (each)	(7)	(141)	(-)	(12)	(10)	(141)	
3 Infantry Regiments (each)	137	2,936	11	134	148	3,070	
Headquarters & Service Company	(24)	(218)	(5)	(14)	(29)	(232)	
Weapons Company	(24)	(195)		(14)	(29)	(232) (195)	
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	(35)	(195)	(2)	(40)	(37)	(195)	
Headquarters Company	(14)	(157)	(2) (2)	(40) (40)	(16)	(301) (197)	
3 Rifle Companies (each)	(7)	(228)	~		(10)	(131) (228)	
Division Totals	843	15,548	119	955	962	16,503	

 1 All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units,

Weapons	Number	Transportation	Number
Carbine, .30 cal., M-1	10.953	Ambulance:	
Flamethrower, portable, M2–2	243	$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4 x 4	52
Flamethrower, mechanized, E4-5	24	$\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4 x 4	12
Gun:		Car, 5-passenger	
37mm, M3, antitank	36	Station wagon, 4 x 4	
75mm, motor carriage, M-3, w/arm-		Tractor:	
ament, radio-equipped (TCS)	12	miscellaneous	7
Gun, Machine:	-2	Trailer:	• •
.30 cal., M1919A4	302	¹ / ₄ -ton, cargo	13
.30 cal., M1917A1	162	¹ / ₂ -ton, dump	19
.50 cal., M2	161	1-ton, cargo	15
Gun, submachine, .45 cal	49	1-ton, water	74
Howitzer:		miscellaneous	11(
75mm pack	24	Truck:	
105mm	24	$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4 x 4	323
Launcher, rocket, antitank, M1A1	172	$\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 4 x 4, with radio	8
Mortar:		1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo	224
60mm	117	1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance	11
81mm	36	2 ¹ / ₂ -ton, 6 x 6, cargo	150
Pistol, .45 cal	399	$2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6 x 6, dump	58
Rifle, .30 cal., M-1	5.436	miscellaneous	68
Rifle, Browning, automatic	853		
Shotgun, 12 gauge	306		
Tank, Army medium, with armament	46		
Vehicle, recovery, M32B2	3		

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION-MARINE DIVISION

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